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INTRODUCTION
The law of environmental standing has reached an important
turning point in its evolution. Climate change litigation-and similar
litigation seeking recovery for the impacts of global environmental
harms-has presented an opportunity for courts to expand the scope of
environmental standing through the concept of risk-based injury.
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Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton is
widely recognized as laying the foundation for environmental standing.'
The language and theory that Justice Douglas employed in his dissent
provide a valuable lens through which to consider standing for global en-
vironmental harms. Although the Court in Sierra Club ultimately con-
cluded that the Sierra Club did not have standing to sue the Secretary of
the Interior of the United States to prevent construction of a proposed ski
resort and recreation area in a national game refuge,2 Justice Douglas's dis-
sent foreshadowed the beginning ofjudicial recognition of substantive in-
jury claims in environmental standing.3 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Douglas concluded that the Court should shift its view on injury to allow
others to sue on behalf of an inanimate object that is about to be ruined
due to another's actions.4
Employing language that is even more relevant today than it was
in 1972, Justice Douglas reasoned that
[t]he critical question of 'standing' would be simplified and
also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate ob-
ject about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage.5
He further clarified the notion of environmental standing by noting that
[tihe river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life
it sustains or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects,... otter,...
deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who
are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound,
or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological
1 405 U.S. 727, 741-52 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 741. The majority concluded by noting that because "the Court of Appeals was
correct in its holding that the Sierra Club lacked standing to maintain this action, [it did]
not reach any other questions presented in the petition, and ... intimate[s] no view on
the merits of the complaint." Id.
3Id. at 741-51 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Courts have recognized three forms of injury in
fact in environmental standing: substantive, procedural, and informational. For a discus-
sion of these categories of injury, see Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening
the Scope ofEnvironmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-in-FactAfter
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POLY 345, 346-47 (1994).
4 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 745.5 1d.
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unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a
meaningful relation to that body of water-whether it be
a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger-must be
able to speak for the values which the river represents and
which are threatened with destruction.'
Justice Douglas compared inanimate environmental objects to other
inanimate objects that have legal recognition to sue, such as a ship or a
corporation.7 He noted that these other objects and entities are viewed
as people for litigation purposes regardless of whether they represent
"proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes."' Justice Douglas
concluded that organizations such as the Sierra Club,9 one of several exist-
ing beneficiaries of the environmental resources at issue in the case, should
be able to speak on behalf of these resources before these "priceless bits
of Americana" are lost forever.' °
On the coattails of Sierra Club, environmental standing enjoyed
a boom period throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, with several major
decisions that expanded environmental litigants' access to the courts to
sue governmental and private entities for alleged environmental harm."
6 Id. at 743.
7 Id. at 742-43.
8ld.
9
"[O]ne of the principal purposes of the Sierra Club is to protect and conserve the national
resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The District Court held that this uncontested
allegation made the Sierra Club 'sufficiently aggrieved' to have 'standing' to sue.... Id.
at 744.
10 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 750.
11 See generally JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL LAws (Envtl. Law Inst. ed., 1987). Several important cases during
that boom period confirm the progress involved in this component of the history of environ-
mental standing. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988),
modified, 850 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff organization suffered injury
in fact from Navy's failure to follow environmental procedures, which was traceable to the
Navy's action of beginning construction before completion of review process, and which
was redressable by favorable decision prohibiting the Navy from construction before com-
pleting permit review process); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that environmental groups had standing to challenge regulations under Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act because injury to aesthetic or recreational interests
supports standing, that being deprived of opportunity to use EIS was constitutionally
sufficient injury on which to base standing, and that indirectness of causation was not
a barrier to standing); Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that environmental group's alleged risks of injury that would result if Oregon
used chemical insecticides in accordance with EIS was sufficient for standing because
actual, threatened, or contingent injury is sufficient to meet the standing requirement);
20081
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In the 1990s, however, environmental standing entered a backlash period,
spearheaded by Justice Scalia's opinions in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation2 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.13 The lower federal courts
wrestled with the implications of these decisions throughout the decade,
which led to conflicting interpretations of what the Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife decision meant for environmental standing. 14
In 2000, the Supreme Court's decision in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services marked the beginning of the pendulum's
swing back toward a more liberal interpretation of environmental stand-
ing.'5 To the extent that Laidlaw may have cracked the door open slightly
for a possible broadened scope of environmental standing, environmental
litigation for global environmental harms since 200316 and, most signifi-
cantly, the Massachusetts v. EPA decision," have thrown that door wide
open.
This Article focuses on the future scope of environmental standing
after Massachusetts v. EPA. Injury in fact has been and remains the most
controversial component of the environmental standing test within and
outside the context of global environmental harms. The Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA is one of the most significant cases in
the history of federal environmental litigation. The case could usher in a
new era of environmental standing; however, the decision leaves questions
City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that agency's failure to pre-
pare an EIS has implied procedural injury component to it that is sufficient injury in fact
to support standing, and that plaintiff had sufficient geographical nexus to challenged
project such that plaintiff could be expected to suffer any environmental harm resulting
from the project).
12 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
13 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
14 See Lisa M. Bromberg, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Where Does the Standing Issue
Stand in Environmental Litigation?, 16AM. J. TRALADvoC. 761 (1993); James E. McElfish
Jr., Drafting Standing Affidavits After Defenders: In the Court's Own Words, 23 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10026 (1993); Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law
Standing, 8 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 343 (1993); Karin P. Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife: The Supreme Court's Slash and Burn Approach to Environmental Standing,
23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10031 (1993).
15 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
16See, e.g., California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, Slip op. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007); NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d
626 (9th Cir. 2004); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D.
Or. 2006); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Complaint,
Native Vill. ofKivaina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. C08-01138-SBA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26,2008).
17 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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as to what degree and under what circumstances it expands the reach of
existing environmental standing jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article discusses the background context of environ-
mental standing for global environmental harms and its corresponding
origins in procedural and substantive injury claims in cases involving
purely domestic environmental harms. Part II examines the landmark
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and considers how it confirms and ex-
tends standing jurisprudence for global environmental harms, yet fails to
resolve some important questions in interpreting the effect of the decision
on environmental standing in future cases. Part III examines the potential
ramifications of Massachusetts v. EPA on the narrower context of pend-
ing and future climate change litigation, whereas Part IV analyzes the
decision's potential implications on environmental standing more gener-
ally in contexts beyond climate change litigation. The Article concludes
that environmental standing jurisprudence will continue to play an im-
portant part in enabling citizens to identify and seek relief for climate
change impacts; however, it must do so in a way that draws on risk assess-
ment methodology to confirm the validity of the risk-based theories that
litigants allege to avoid the potential for an unwelcome flood of claims
that the courts are not qualified to address.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING FOR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
HARMS
The elements of both traditional standing" and procedural standing,
as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in 1992, were confirmed more
than a decade later in Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department
of Energy.'9 To satisfy the three elements of traditional Article III stand-
ing, the plaintiff must establish that (1) there exists an "injury in fact,"
which has been defined as "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that
is both (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged
action; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely possible or speculative,
that a favorable decision will rectify the injury.2 ° The plaintiff must show
that the injury is "certainly impending" in order to satisfy the imminence
18 "Traditional standing" refers to claims alleging substantive injury, as distinguished
from procedural or informational injuries. See Abate & Myers, supra note 3, at 346-47.
" 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003). These elements and principles remain intact after
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, discussed in Part II, infra.20 Border Power Plant, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
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component of the injury in fact element.21 This requirement helps to en-
sure that standing is not conferred on a party to whom no injury would
have occurred at all in the absence ofjudicial action.22 The plaintiff must
have a personal stake in the outcome for the injury to be considered particu-
larized, and the plaintiff must show that it has suffered or is in immedi-
ate danger of suffering some direct injury resulting from the "challenged
statute or official conduct" for injury to be considered concrete.23
Regarding the causation and redressability elements, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.24
This requires the injury to be "fairly trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant," not a result of any independent action.25 Finally, it must
be "likely," not "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favor-
able decision." 2
6
Two basic elements are required for procedural standing: (1) the
plaintiff must be a person "accorded a procedural right to protect his con-
crete interests"; and (2) the plaintiff must have some concrete interest
threatened that is the ultimate foundation of his or her standing.27 In ad-
dition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that its interest is within the
"zone of interests" that the contested statute is intended to protect. 28
Finally, some courts have required that a plaintiff alleging a procedural
injury must have "a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the chal-
lenged project that [it] may be expected to suffer whatever environmen-
tal consequences the project may have."29
Litigants seeking to challenge agency decisions and projects that
cause climate change impacts needed to start small to lay a foundation of
judicial acceptance of their theories. This first step came in the form of
claims alleging procedural and informational injuries. After courts accepted
a procedural injury connection in this context, plaintiffs then were better
equipped to shift their focus to the more ambitious theory of substantive
injury. In the years leading up to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, courts struggled to determine appropriate limits on
21 id.
22 id.
23 Id.
' See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 561.
2Id. at 573.
2 Id.
' See Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484,491 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting City of
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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substantive injury for global environmental harms under the "increased
risk of harm" standard.
A. Procedural Injury for Increased Risk of Global Environmental
Harms
The informational and procedural focus of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act ("NEPA")' served as the basis on which to build an
opportunity to confer standing to challenge activities that contribute to
global environmental harms. In Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Lujan, the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") contended that
a legislative impact statement pertaining to the future of the Arctic
National Wildlife National Refuge ("the Refuge") was not sufficiently
explanatory and could ultimately harm the environment.31 The court
confirmed that a plaintiff must show that he has personally suffered
actual or threatened injury due to the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.32 The court further
noted, however, that the "procedural and informational thrust of NEPA
gives rise to a cognizable injury from denial of its explanatory process, so
long as there is a reasonable risk that environmental harm may occur."3
Applying this procedural and informational standing standard, the
plaintiffs alleged that their members use and enjoy the Refuge and that
the inadequacies of the legislative impact statement created a risk that
serious environmental impacts to the Refuge would be overlooked. 34 The
court noted that recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment are among the
interests that NEPA was designed to protect.3'5 Therefore, because the
NRDC showed that the legislative impact statement created a risk of
harm to its members and that NEPA was meant to protect against such
harm, the court held that the NRDC had standing to sue.'6
One year later, the procedural and informational focus of NEPA
was applied in the climate change context in Foundation on Economic
30 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
31 768 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D.D.C. 1991).32 Id. at 876-77 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
3Id. at 877.
' Id. at 877-78.351 Id. at 878.3 6NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 878 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Safety
Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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Trends v. Watkins.3v The plaintiff sued to declare unlawful certain actions
of the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary
of the Interior in permitting, carrying out, approving, funding, or partici-
pating in programs or actions that contribute to global warming without
considering the impacts of those contributions pursuant to environmental
impact review requirements under NEPA.38 The plaintiff asserted that
the defendants' alleged failure to adequately consider the global warm-
ing effects of specific federal actions and programs under their authority
harmed the plaintiffs information-distributing activities regarding global
warming to the public.3 9 The court reasoned that informational injury
alone could likely remove any standing requirement in NEPA cases, and
that the court no longer regards informational standing alone under NEPA
as a sound concept.' ° Since the plaintiff in this case claimed standing based
solely on informational injury, the court found that the plaintiff lacked
standing."
Fifteen years after Foundation on Economic Trends, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California determined
in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher that the plaintiff had standing
under NEPA in a suit seeking to require federal agency defendants to
consider the climate change impacts of their decisions to fund develop-
ment projects in foreign countries. 2 Friends of the Earth is significant in
7 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992).
38 Id. at 396.
39 Id. at 398.
40 Id. at 398-99.
41 Id. at 399.
42 NO. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2005). For a detailed discussion
of Friends of the Earth, see Kevin T. Haroff& Katherine K Moore, Global Climate Change
and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 155, 169-82 (2007).
Procedural injury analysis is not limited to the NEPA context, however. A plain-
tiff can enforce procedural rights as long as the questioned procedures are intended to
protect a threatened and concrete interest that is his ultimate basis for standing. See Ctr.
for Biodiversity v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,573 n.8 (1992)). In Abraham, procedural injury was
applied to the air pollution context. The plaintiffs' grounds for procedural standing were
first that the air pollution standards in question would affect federal and local fleets in
the area of the plaintiffs which would then limit air pollution control in a way that would
impact the plaintiffs; and second, that three of the plaintiffs alleged that they missed an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that
nearby private and local fleets contribute to plainiffs' injuries and that these injuries could
be remedied by rulemaking. Id. The result of rulemaking may not be certain, but when a
plaintiff is attempting to enforce a procedural requirement that could impair a separate
concrete interest of theirs if it is disregarded, the plaintiffcan establish procedural standing
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Id.
128 [Vol. 33:121
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two important respects. First, it helped catalog the ways in which climate
change impacts manifest themselves. This important scientific data has
laid a foundation to support assertions regarding the scope and nature of
climate change impacts in subsequent climate change litigation and has
underscored the need to consider those effects in federal agency decision-
making. Second, the case significantly enhanced the likelihood of recovery
for future plaintiffs asserting increased risk of substantive injury from the
impacts of global environmental harms like climate change and strato-
spheric ozone depletion.
B. Substantive Injury for Local Impacts of Global Environmental
Harms
NEPA claims were a necessary first step in securing an avenue of
judicial recognition for standing to address global environmental harms.
On the coattails of these successes, substantive injury claims for local im-
pacts of global environmental harms could proceed more effectively based
on the increased risk of future harm theory. These claims were further
buttressed by a strong foundation of substantive injury jurisprudence in
the context of domestic environmental harms.
The modem era of substantive injury analysis in environmental
standing can be traced to Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Sierra
Club v. Morton.43 Twenty years later, the Court tailored its view on sub-
stantive standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' which has served as
the framework for all substantive and procedural injury claims in envi-
ronmental law since 1992.
In Lujan, the plaintiff challenged the Secretary of the Interior's reg-
ulation requiring agencies to confer with him, pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"), solely for federally funded projects in the United States
and on the high seas.45 Applying the substantive standing analytical
43 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
45 Id. at 558-559. (Syllabus)
Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 divides responsi-
bilities regarding the protection of endangered species between petitioner
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce, and requires
each federal agency to consult with the relevant Secretary to ensure that
any action funded by the agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence or habitat of any endangered or threatened species. Both
Secretaries initially promulgated a joint regulation extending § 7(a)(2)'s
coverage to actions taken in foreign nations, but a subsequent joint
12920081
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framework, the Court determined that the plaintiff did not have standing
to bring its claim." The Court held that although the plaintiffs "desire to
use or observe" a species is indeed a cognizable interest for standing pur-
poses, this cognizable interest does not itself rise to the level of injury in
fact because the plaintiff is not among those actually injured.47 Although
the plaintiffhad established that the endangered species was threatened
by funded activities, the organization failed to allege specific facts that at
least one of its members was directly threatened in a manner other than
a mere "special interest" in the species.48
The Court properly concluded on these facts that the nexus be-
tween the alleged harmful activity and the alleged impact was insufficient
to establish injury in fact. Therefore, Lujan effectively illustrates the prop-
osition that "bad facts make bad law." The plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the role of the ESA in foreign countries when no member of its
organization alleged concrete plans to visit the sites where U.S. activities
were allegedly placing endangered species in peril.49 The Court reasoned
that the plaintiffs members' intentions to return some day to these sites
where such members allegedly would be deprived of the opportunity to
enjoy these species was insufficient to satisfy the "actual or imminent"
standard."
The Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.51 put environmental standing back on track. Tangible and
local environmental harms made for good environmental standing prece-
dent in this case. More significantly, for purposes of this Article, the case
provided the right scenario for a new era of environmental standing based
on purely domestic, local sources of harm. Here, the plaintiffs "reasonable
fear" of pollution in a local river that the defendant polluted through its
Clean Water Act permit violations, causing the organization's members
to refrain from use of the river, constituted an injury to the plaintiffs
aesthetic and recreational interests in the river.52 Consequently, the case
rule limited the section's geographic scope to the United States and the
high seas.
Id. at 555.
4Id. at 562.47 Id. at 562-63.
4Id. at 563.49 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563-64.
50 Id. at 564.
5' 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
52 See id. at 181-84.
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helped pave the way for substantive injury claims for global environmental
harms with corresponding local effects.
Lujan and Laidlaw taken together stand for the proposition that
the exacting "concrete and particularized... actual or imminent, not con-
jectural or hypothetical" standard from Lujan can be met with allegations
of injury that are narrowly tailored to focus on the use and enjoyment of
local resources as in Laidlaw.53 Therefore, the new challenge for courts in
evaluating substantive injury for local impacts of global environmental
harms such as climate change and ozone depletion is determining how
to develop a standard to govern the degree to which a challenged action
must increase the risk of harm that flows from a defendant's action for
a plaintiff to be deemed to have suffered an injury.
Mere allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient to
satisfy Article III standing requirements.54 Injury in fact can be met by
a threat of future harm or by an act that harms the plaintiff only by in-
creasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would not have other-
wise faced without the defendant's actions. 5 An increased risk of future
injury that is imminent is sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact require-
ment."6 In increased risk cases, a plaintiff must assert a "credible threat
of harm," but the likelihood of harm that a plaintiff must show to establish
a cognizable injury in fact varies with the severity of the likely harm.57
Differentiating between a threatened injury, which satisfies the
injury in fact requirement, and a speculative/hypothetical injury, which
does not, must be considered on a case-by-case basis.58 Several cases illus-
trate how courts have wrestled with defining the scope of the increased
risk of future harm standard. In Koch v. Hicks, the plaintiffs sought relief
for alleged groundwater contamination caused by the defendant's use of
53 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Koch v. Hicks, 457 F. Supp. 2d 298, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
55Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007). See also Denney v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264-65 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that exposure to toxic substances
satisfies injury in fact requirement even though mere exposure may not provide sufficient
basis for claim under state tort law); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574-
75 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that standing is established where defective medical implement
presented increased risk of future health problems); Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490, 498 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
present impact of future harm, even if such harm is uncertain, may be sufficient injury
in fact for standing purposes).
' Koch, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 304-05.57 Id. at 305.
5 Id.
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the gasoline additive, MTBE.59 The plaintiffs alleged a threat of imminent
harm for three reasons: first, neighboring properties tested positive for
MTBE-even though the plaintiffs' property had not; second, the residents
surrounding the gas station relied on the same aquifer as the gas station
for their water needs and this aquifer was contaminated; and third,
MTBE is highly soluble, travels fast in water, and can remain in aquifers
for decades.6" The court concluded that the plaintiffs sufficiently estab-
lished a credible risk of imminent harm, which is all that is required at
the pleading stage to establish Article III standing.6 '
The increased risk of harm standard was applied to confer stand-
ing for substantive injuries in the Clean Water Act context in Central
Delta Water Agency v. United States." In this case, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant's method of operating a reservoir was likely to cause
the salinity of the water in the San Joaquin River to exceed the applicable
water quality standard at various times.63 Since the plaintiffs used this
water for their crops, they alleged that their ability to grow the crops would
be hindered by the highly saline water.64 Although the alleged injury had
yet to occur, the court concluded that the threat of injury from the defen-
dant's use of an operational plan that will likely cause a violation of the
water quality standard was sufficient to support standing.65 The court
reasoned that to require actual evidence of environmental harm instead
of an increased risk due to violation of the statute would misinterpret
the nature of environmental harm and would undermine the policy of the
Clean Water Act.66
Conversely, allegations regarding global warming were among the
six categories67 of substantive injuries that the court determined to be insuf-
ficient to confer standing in Center for Biological Diversity v. Abraham."8
59 Id. at 302.60 Id. at 306-07.
61Id. at 307.
62 306 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2002).
6Id. at 947.
61 Id.
65 Id. at 948.
6 Id.
67 The six categories of alleged injuries were: (1) concerns about the harmful health effects
of smog and air pollution resulting from vehicle emissions; (2) concerns and allegations
about global warming; (3) traffic complaints; (4) concerns about the threat oil exploration
will have on wildlife areas in the U.S. that are "important" to certain members; (5) aes-
thetic injuries; and (6) obstruction of an expressed intent to buy an alternative fuel vehicle
("AFV"). Ctr. for Biodiversity v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2002).RId. at 1154-55.
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The plaintiffs sued to enforce certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act
of 1992 relating to alternative fuel vehicles ("AFVs"), which they claimed
the defendants had violated.69 Because the court found the plaintiffs' global
warming concerns and assertions to be too abstract and conjectural to be
caused by the defendants' failure to comply with certain provisions of the
Energy Policy Act, and to be unlikely rectified by the relief requested, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the injury requirement
of Article III standing for these allegations. °
Drawing support from the context of standing for domestic envi-
ronmental harms with local impacts, there has been a corresponding trend
toward linking substantive injury to global environmental harms in a line
of cases involving ozone depletion. This modern-day expansion of environ-
mental standing can be traced to Covington v. Jefferson County in 2004.'
In Covington, the plaintiffs, landowners who lived near a county landfill,
brought a Clean Air Act ("CAA") citizen suit against the county and dis-
trict health department.72 The plaintiffs claimed that Jefferson County
violated the CAA through its failure to follow federal procedures for re-
moval and recapture of many ozone-depleting substances prior to disposal
or recycling.7" The leakage of liquids and gases that the plaintiffs had ob-
served from "white goods," more commonly known as appliances, caused
them to fear that this leakage would pollute their property.14 As such, the
plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property had been compromised. 5
The court determined that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient
to establish injury in fact due to the increased risk of harm to the plain-
tiffs' property resulting from the defendants' failure to comply with the
CAA.7'6 The court concluded that a credible risk of harm to the plaintiffs'
home yields a loss of enjoyment to their property and this loss of enjoy-
ment is sufficient to establish injury for CAA claims.
69 Id. at 1148.
'
0 Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734 (1972)).
71 358 F.3d 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2004).72 Id. at 633-34.
73 Id. at 640.74 Id. at 634-35, 641.7 1 Id. at 641.
76 Id. at 641.77 Covington, 358 F.3d at 638. Similarly, the court also recognized that the plaintiffs live
directly across the street from the landfill, and that if the landfill were not operated as
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") requires, the plaintiffs would be
threatened by the risks that RCRA is intended to minimize--"[]ires, explosions, vectors,
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Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corpo-
ration" further expanded plaintiffs' ability to establish substantive injury
claims for local impacts of global environmental harms. In Owens Corning,
the plaintiff alleged that Owens Corning Corporation was constructing a
polystyrene foam insulation manufacturing facility that had the potential
to emit more than 250 tons per year of various harmful gases."9 The plain-
tiff further claimed that Owens Corning did not obtain a required precon-
struction permit, which, if proven, is a violation of Section 165(a) of the
CAA.8° The plaintiff further alleged that Owens Coming violated provi-
sions of Oregon's state implementation plan, which requires any facility
that will emit more than 100 tons per year of a regulated air pollutant to
obtain an Air Contaminant Discharge Permit prior to construction."' The
plaintiff also asserted its fear that the Owens Coming facility's emissions
will heighten the risk that members of its organization will contract
certain diseases and that the facility will contribute to global warming,
which will in turn harm environmental resources in Oregon that the
organization's members use."2
scavengers, and groundwater contamination." Id. Violations of RCRA increase the
likelihood that the plaintiffs will be directly confronted with these risks, which in turn
threaten the plaintiffs' "enjoyment of life and security of home." Id. The court stated that
because the landfill and the plaintiffs are neighbors, increased risks of such injuries
resulting from the defendant's violation of RCRA, and subsequent improper operation of
the landfill, are not speculative or hypothetical. Id. The plaintiffs presented facts showing
fires; excessive animals, insects, and other scavengers that were attracted to the
uncovered garbage; and groundwater contamination; all of which the court concluded
strongly evidenced "a concrete risk of harm" to the plaintiffs sufficient to satisfy the
injury requirement. Id. The plaintiffs also presented evidence of RCRA violations
adversely affecting the enjoyment of their home and land in that the RCRA violations
made them "suffer from watering eyes and burning noses." Id. The court noted that even
if the plaintiffs had only alleged threats to the aesthetic and recreational enjoyment of
their property, the harms caused by the RCRA violations were sufficient on this basis
alone to satisfy the injury in fact standard. Covington, 358 F.3d at 638.
7 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006).79 Id. at 959-60.8 0Id. at 960; 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2000).
81 Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (citing OR. ADMIN. Rs. 340-216-0020,
340-210-0215, 340-210-0240 (2007)).82 Id. at 960.
Plaintiffs cite a report predicting that "global warming will have the
following impacts in the Pacific Northwest: increased regional temper-
atures leading to an increased elevation in the upper tree line, prolonged
allergy season, earlier breeding by plants and animals, and an increased
fire season; rising sea levels, leading to increased erosion and a loss of
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The court relied heavily on Covington in concluding that although
a plaintiff must still show conclusive injury in fact, he does not have to
wait until he has been harmed before seeking relief, especially when "the
injuries are of a kind not readily redressed by damages." 3 The court
determined that a "concrete risk of harm" to the plaintiff is sufficient to
satisfy the injury in fact requirement.'
Applying this standard to the Owens Corning scenario, the court
noted that the plaintiff only alleged "fear" and "concern" about potential
injury, as opposed to a more concrete documentation that they "will" sus-
tain harm. 5 Relying on recent environmental standing jurisprudence, 6
the court nevertheless concluded that even these unstable allegations can
be enough to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. 7 The court was careful
to note, however, that these allegations have limitations. The court distin-
guished the facts in Owens Corning from those in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife. 8 More specifically, the court looked to the close interrelationship
in Owens Corning between those claiming to have a threat of harm and
the direct impact of the emissions on that locality. 9 In doing so, the court
land along the coastline; a decline in snowpack, which will lead to an
increase in spring runoff, followed by decreased water levels in streams
in the summer and fall; and a change in ocean circulation which will
cause increased stress on estuarine species."
Id. at 960 n.1.
' Owens Coming, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (citing Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d
626, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)).8 4Id.
85 Id.
' Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000);
Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004); Cent. Delta Water Agency
v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002).
87 Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64.
8 Ultimately, in attempting to establish standing, the plaintiffs in
Defenders of Wildlife could point to little more than a general concern
about global environmental issues, and a belief that loss of any species,
even on the other side of the world, diminishes the planet as a whole.
Perhaps it is true that"[a]ny man's death diminishes me, because I am
involved in Mankind,"... but something more is required to establish
standing in a federal court.... The Complaint at issue here avoids
those defects.
Id. at 965.
89 The challenged emissions source is local, not halfway aroundthe globe.
Members of the Plaintiff organizations reside, work, and recreate near
the partialy-completed... facility. Assuming the truth of the allegations
in the Complaint, as I must on a motion to dismiss, those individuals
would suffer some direct impact from emissions entering into the atmo-
sphere from Defendant's facility, as would the local ecosystem with which
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concluded that because Oregon, the local ecosystem in which the plaintiffs'
members resided, would suffer a direct impact from the adverse effects
of the emissions, the plaintiff had established injury in fact.9 °
Most recently, Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA9 further
illustrates the courts' newfound acceptance of injury from risk of impacts
caused by ozone depletion. The United States and several other countries
entered into the Montreal Protocol, an agreement that required the par-
ticipating countries to reduce and ultimately eliminate any ozone-depleting
chemicals.9 2 The United States immediately incorporated these changes
into the CAA; however, in 1997, well after the changes were put into action,
the Protocol called for a complete ban on the use and consumption of
methyl bromide93 by 2005.9" The EPA began the process of identifying all
critical uses of methyl bromide, and once it proposed these uses, they were
highly scrutinized.95 In 2004, the United States' use of methyl bromide was
limited to less than ten thousand metric tons per year for only sixteen
accepted categories of critical use of methyl bromide. 6
After a final decision was made, the EPA created a new proposal
pursuant to the new limitations. 7 However, the plaintiff, along with sev-
eral other parties, submitted a comment on this new proposal, claiming
these individuals constantly interact.... [Tihe adverse effects alleged
in Plaintiffs' Complaint would be felt by them here in Oregon, and the
source of Defendant's emissions would be in Oregon.
Id.
90/d.
9 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), reh'g denied, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3965 (Feb. 21, 2007).
92 Id. at 2-3.
93
"Methyl bromide is a naturally occurring gas produced by oceans, grass and forest fires,
and volcanoes." Id. at 4 (citing U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agric. Research Serv., Soil Physics
& Pesticide Research: Methyl Bromide 1 (2005), available at http://www.ars.usda.gov/
Research/docs.htm?docid=10408). "Methyl bromide is typically injected into soil as a fu-
migant before several types of crops are planted. The United States regulates methyl
bromide as a'class I' ozone-depleting substance."Id. It has an"ozone depletion potential"
("ODP") of 0.38-0.60, which places it
in the middle range of substances scheduled for elimination under the
Protocol. It is not nearly as destructive as chlorofluorocarbons and most
other class I substances, almost all of which were phased out in 2000.
Nevertheless, it is significantly more destructive than"class I" substances,
which are to be phased out in 2030.
Id.
9Id. at 3-4.95 NRDC, 464 F.3d at 4.
96 Id. at5.9 7Id.
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that the amount of methyl bromide proposed was not the "technically and
economically feasible minimum."98
The D.C. Circuit evaluated whether at least one of the NRDC's
members had standing to sue under the CAA.99 In evaluating the injury
in fact requirement, the court addressed whether there was a "substantial
probability" that the NRDC's members would be injured from the use of
methyl bromide. 10 The court looked to the expert testimony that over the
members' lifetime, they would experience a cumulative risk of harm from
methyl bromide.'0 ' The court ultimately concluded that NRDC's members
suffered injury in fact due to their cumulative lifetime risk of harm from
methyl bromide.0 2
These modern-day expansions from the ozone depletion context
regarding what constitutes injury in fact helped lay the foundation for the
United States Supreme Court's analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA. The
focus in Massachusetts v. EPA shifted from ozone depletion to climate
change, but the context of the atmosphere as the source of threatened
harm remained constant.
10 3
II. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, concerns about climate
change impacts have consumed citizens, lawmakers, and the private sector
in the United States at an ever-increasing pace. This heightened attention
fueled a firestorm of climate change litigation in the United States as a way
to goad the recalcitrant Bush administration to devise and implement a
98 /d.
99Id. at 5-6.
'° Id. at6.
101 NRDC, 464 F.3d at 6-7.
NRDC's expert quantified the increased risk posed by EPA's rule in an
affidavit stating that "it is reasonable to expect more than 10 deaths,
more than 2,000 nonfatal skin cancer cases, and more than 700 cataract
cases to result from the 16.8 million pounds of new production and con-
sumption allowed by the 2005 exemption rule.
Id.
o Id. at 7. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of NRDC v. EPA, see infra
Part IV.C.
10 3 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); see also Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969,
976 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a showing of a plausible threat to the plaintiffs physical
well-being from airborne pollutants is within the range of injuries that are recognized to
confer standing).
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mandatory federal legislative response to address this important issue.'"
Though not the first case in this explosion of climate change disputes in the
courts, and certainly not the last, Massachusetts v. EPA is the most widely
publicized and, arguably, most significant in this line of cases because
of its potential to shape the future of environmental standing to address
environmental harms within and outside the climate change context.
10 5
A. The D.C. Circuit Court's Decision
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit reviewed and dismissed
petitions appealing the EPA's conclusion that it did not have statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
and that, even if it did, it would not exercise this authority at that time.' °
Before evaluating the authority of the EPA, the court addressed the
petitioners' standing to sue.' 7 The EPA claimed that the petitioners had
not shown that their alleged injuries were caused by EPA's decision not to
" See Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the
Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POLY 369,392-97 (2006).
... See infra Part III.B for a discussion of significant pending climate change litigation.
106 415 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In 1999, a group of private environmental organizations
petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to regulate emissions of such
greenhouse gases as methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons and, most notably, carbon
dioxide from motor vehicles pursuant to Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. R. Bruce Barze Jr.
& Thomas L. Casey, The future of greenhouse gas emissions regulation: Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 269, 269-71 (2007). Section 202(a)(1)
requires the EPA to regulate the emissions of air pollutants from new motor vehicles that,
in its evaluation and conclusion, contribute to air pollution that may endanger public
health or welfare. Id. at 270-71; see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
The EPA ultimately denied the group's petition on the merits, concluding that
it lacked authority under the CAA to promulgate regulations to address global climate
change. Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 58-59. The EPA went a step further to conclude that
even if it did have the authority to regulate such emissions, there was no established link
between these greenhouse gases and the harms caused by them. Id. at 57. In making its
decision, the EPA relied on the National Research Council's ("NRC's") "objective and inde-
pendent assessment of the relevant science."Id. Generally, the NRC noted that an increase
in carbon dioxide levels is not always accompanied by a corresponding rise in global temper-
atures and thus concluded that "there is considerable uncertainty in current understanding
of how the climate system varies naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases."
Id. Relying on the NRC's assessment, the EPA concluded that it was not able to exercise
any authority at that time. Id. As a result, the group sought the D.C. Circuit's review of
the EPA's decision to refrain from regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 50.
... Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 53-54.
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regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from mobile sources.'i8 In addition,
the EPA claimed that the petitioners had not shown that their injuries
could be "redressed by a decision in their favor" by the court.0 9
The court evaluated two declarations the petitioners prepared in
anticipation of the EPA's standing argument. 1 ° One declaration from a
climatologist stated that reductions in carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases from vehicles in the United States alone would "delay and
moderate many of the adverse impacts of global warming.""' The clima-
tologist further estimated that other countries would follow in the EPA's
footsteps if the EPA attempted to reduce such emissions." 2 The other
declaration from a mechanical engineer stated that there was "no doubt
that establishing emissions standards for pollutants that contribute to
global warming would lead to investment in developing improved tech-
nologies to reduce those emissions from motor vehicles, and that success-
ful technologies would gradually be mandated by other countries around
the world.""'
In considering these declarations, the court noted that at the final
stage of litigation there is a difference between supporting an allegation
and proving an allegation".4 and that the evidence plaintiff presented at
summary judgment must be "supported adequately by the evidence ad-
duced at trial."" 5 The court then noted that as an appellate court, its job
was not to scrutinize the evidence presented to find the truth."6 Instead,
the court decided to confirm the EPA's finding that the causation of harm
from motor vehicle emissions was unclear and to uphold the EPA's con-
clusion to refrain from regulating such emissions at that time." 7
Although the court sided with the EPA in its determination that
the causes of harm were unclear, it concluded that a determination of
standing and merits "often overlap""' and that it would follow previous
'
08 Id. at 54.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"I Id.
112 Zd.
113 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 55.
"'Id. (quotingLujan's holding that"when a plaintiffs standing is challenged in a motion
for summary judgment, the plaintiff must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific
facts,'. . . which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken as true.") Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 55-56.
"' Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 56 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, 97 n.2 (1988)).
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statutory standing cases and assume that the EPA had statutory author-
ity to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles." 9
To address whether the EPA was correct in abstaining from regulat-
ing new motor vehicle emissions, the court reviewed the information pro-
vided by the NRC study and used by the EPA in its initial assessment of
its authority.'20 The court noted that in requiring the EPA Administrator
to make a threshold judgment about whether to regulate, Section 202(a)(1)
gives the Administrator considerable discretion. 121 Policy judgments, such
as the ones Congress makes when deciding whether to enact legislation
regulating an area, also may be taken into account. 122
The court examined the EPA Administrator's scientific and polit-
ical evaluation and concluded that both scientific and political evidence
was presented in favor of abstaining from current EPA regulation of new
motor vehicle emissions.' 2 ' For example, the EPA argued that new motor
vehicle emissions are but one avenue for greenhouse gas emissions 124 and
that creating regulations for new motor vehicles would "result in an in-
efficient, piecemeal approach to the climate change issue."12' Addition-
ally, the EPA emphasized policy concerns for global market motivations,
stating that if it regulated these new motor vehicle emissions, many other
countries may not be as motivated to continue their regulations or to create
new regulations. 12 Furthermore, the EPA noted that it already had pri-
vate entity incentives in place to control their individual emissions. 2 v
The court concluded that the EPA properly used both scientific
analysis and policy judgments in its refusal to regulate the greenhouse gas
emissions and denied all petitions for review. 128 The petitioners appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.
19 Id. at 56.
'
20 Id. at 57.
121 Id. at 58 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
122 Id. at 58.
123 id.
12 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 58.
125 id.
126 id.
127 Id. "Ongoing research into scientific uncertainties and the Administration's programs
to address climate change-including voluntary emission reduction programs and
initiatives with private entities to develop new technology-also played a role in the
Administrator's decision not to regulate." Id.1
'
2 Id. at 58-59.
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B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court faced the issues of
whether petitioners, including Massachusetts as an intervening party,
had standing to sue and could petition for review of the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision and, if so, whether the EPA properly denied
regulating new motor vehicle emissions.'29 As to its capacity to review the
case, the Court noted that because it was called upon to interpret the
proper construction of a congressional statute, a job reserved for the fed-
eral court system, it was able to make a legal determination about the
case and controversy. 3 °
In its standing analysis, the Court noted that Congress has the rare
power "to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before,"' 3 ' but cautioned
that there must be a causal link between the injury Congress intends to
justify and the harm caused to persons claiming a need for vindication. 13
There was considerable administrative confusion in interpreting
this necessary link. The EPA claimed that because greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles cause "widespread harm," any standing
claim would be immensely confusing and would potentially overwhelm
the Court.'33 The Court disagreed, and concluded that a determination
of standing hinges upon whether one has a "personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination. " "'
129 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
130 See id. at 1452-53.
131 Id. at 1453 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)).
132 Id.
133 Id.
13 Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
Justice Kennedy elaborated on this point in Lujan, stating that
[wihile it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the
challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action
injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is not just
an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversarial process
by assuring both that the parties before the court have an actual, as op-
posed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that the legal questions
presented... will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a de-
bating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581.
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To guarantee that standing is properly established, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife requires a plaintiff to show that it suffered a con-
crete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the
injury is reasonably traceable to the defendant, and that the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'35 However, when Congress
gives a procedural right to a litigant to protect that litigant's concrete
interests, the litigant can assert that right even though the litigant has
not met the normal redressability and immediacy standards.'36 When a
litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if some
possibility exists that the relief requested will trigger the injury-causing
party to re-evaluate and reconsider the allegedly harmful decision. 3 v
In the present case, Congress ordered the EPA to protect
Massachusetts and its citizens by specifying appropriate standards to
be applied to the "emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicle engines which in [the Administrator's] judgment
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare." 38 Congress also granted
Massachusetts a related procedural right to dispute the EPA's rejection
of its rulemaking petition as "arbitrary and capricious." 39 Given Massa-
chusetts's interest in protecting its "quasi-sovereign" objectives, and its
concern that its vested procedural right was wrongfully withheld, the
Court concluded that the petitioners satisfied "the most demanding
standards of the adversarial process."14°
In addressing the petitioners' injury, the Court focused on present
factors, as well as the possibility of future harm.'4' As examples of
present harm, the Court referred to the NRC report, which the EPA
relied on in concluding that it lacked authority to regulate new motor
vehicle emissions."' The Court noted that there are a number of already
identified harms, such as the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduc-
tion in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers and lakes,
15 Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1453.
136Id.
137 id.
'm Id. at 1454 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)).
139 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
'40 Id. at 1454-55.
141 Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1455-56.
142 Id. at 1455 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
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and the accelerated rate of the rise of sea levels during the twentieth
century relative to the past few thousand years.'43
The Court also considered the future harms that the petitioners
referenced."' For example, climate change scientists have come to a
"strong consensus" that
[G] lobal warming threatens many negative environmental
changes, such as a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end
of the century, severe and irreversible changes to natural
ecosystems, a significant reduction in water storage in
winter snowpack in mountainous regions with direct and
important economic consequences, an increase in the spread
of disease, and rising ocean temperatures that may con-
tribute to the ferocity of hurricanes. 4 5
The Court stressed that simply because Massachusetts shares these
present and future harms with other states, and quite possibly even
with other countries, it should not be barred from bringing a claim and
should be considered "injured" for purposes of the injury element of
standing.14
The Court then referred to specific facts relating to the effects of
global warming on Massachusetts. 47 Specifically, the continuing rise of
global sea levels as a result of global warming has "already begun to
swallow Massachusetts' coastal land." 4" Because Massachusetts "owns
a substantial portion of the state's coastal property," it has alleged a par-
ticularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.'49 The Court agreed
with the petitioners that "the severity of that injury will only increase over
the course of the next century, [and that] if sea levels continue to rise as
predicted,... a significant fraction of coastal property could be 'either
permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic
143 Id.
1 Id. "Petitioners allege that this only hints at the environmental damage yet to come." Id.
141 Id. at 1455-56.
'"Id. at 1456. "That these . .. change [s] are. . . 'widely shared' does not minimize
Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation." Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 1456
(citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
147 Id. at 1456.
148 Id.
149Id.
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storm surge and flooding events. '" ' 50 Therefore, the Court concluded that
Massachusetts demonstrated sufficient present and future injury.' 5 '
The Court had little to address in regards to causation primarily
because of the EPA's failure to assert any real motive to support its
inaction.'52 The EPA admitted that there is a causal connection between
man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, but nonetheless
argued that from a global standpoint, even if it did regulate these emis-
sions, its effort would be in vain due to the minimal effect any regulation
would have.'53 However, the Court disagreed with the EPA's pessimistic
view of its ability to bring about change and encourage other countries to
follow suit." Instead, the Court noted that even though EPA's regulation
of new motor vehicle emissions may not render substantial change imme-
diately, the administrative process will likely develop in time and adjust
"to meet particular, unforeseeable situations."'55 The Court concluded that
just because "a first step might be tentative does not by itself support the
notion that federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step
conforms to law."'56
Furthermore, the Court opposed the EPA's view that regulating
new motor vehicle emissions is a tentative step. 5 ' The Court noted that
because the United States' motor vehicle emissions make a meaningful
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations, they also contribute sig-
nificantly to global warming. 5' In support of this conclusion, the Court ob-
served that the emissions from the transportation sector represent approx-
imately one-third of this country's total carbon dioxide emissions.' 9 The
150 Id.
' Id. at 1458.
152 Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1457. "EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal
connection between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a mini-
mum, therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions 'contributes' to Massachusetts'
injuries." Id.
15 Id. EPA concluded that it"does not believe that any realistic possibility exists that the
relief petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy their injuries."
Id. EPA contended that its efforts would not have any positive impact on global warming
as a whole, especially because "predicted increases in greenhouse gas emissions from
developing nations, particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal domestic
decrease." Id.1
" See id.
155 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 1457 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,202 (1947)).
156 Id. at 1457.
157 Id
158 Id.
159Id.
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Court also observed that even with the emission regulations at issue in this
case, the United States "would still rank as the third-largest emitter of
carbon dioxide in the world, outpaced only by the European Union and
China."" Thus, when looked at from any angle, the regulation of new motor
vehicle emissions makes a contribution to the causation of global warming."6 '
Finally, with respect to redressability, the Court stated that al-
though global warming itself cannot be reversed, the Court nonetheless
retains jurisdiction to decide whether the EPA should regulate emissions
with the intent to reduce or slow down the global warming process.162 More-
over, the Court noted that the time it takes to bring about such changes
is irrelevant; the consequences of refusing to regulate outweigh the time
hindrances involved in regulation.'63 The Court concluded by adding that
the risk of global warming would be reduced to some extent if the peti-
tioners received the relief they sought." Therefore, the Court concluded
that the petitioners had standing to sue. 6 '
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA adopted a long-overdue, risk-
based approach to its environmental standing jurisprudence. The EPA's
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions was deemed to present a risk
of harm to Massachusetts that is both actual and imminent. Here, there
was a mix of harm that already happened and harm that was yet to
occur-strong facts on which to blaze this new trail as the next step for-
ward in the evolution of environmental standing. Sea level rise had al-
ready caused harm to the Massachusetts coast and yet that harm was but
a preview of future climate change impacts to the affected areas.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR STANDING IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, courts have struggled to
determine the extent to which the Court's analysis may be applied to con-
texts involving domestic and global environmental harms. This part of the
Article considers questions that remain in interpreting Massachusetts
160 Id.
161 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 1457-58.
162 Id. at 1458.
" Id.; see also Vill. of Elk Grove v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 328 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[Elven a
small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy-to take a suit out
of the category of the hypothetical-provided of course that the relief sought would, if
granted, reduce the probability.").
' Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 1458.
165 Id.
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v. EPA and its impact on standing in climate change litigation. 6 It first
explores the extent to which the analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA is
limited to suits brought by states in their quasi-sovereign capacity. It then
considers theories that have been presented in pending climate change
cases that raise important policy questions in evaluating the future of this
new area of environmental standing jurisprudence.
A. Special Solicitude of States
In considering Massachusetts's capacity to sue, the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA concluded that this issue was resolved long ago
in its decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company."' In Tennessee
Copper, Georgia sought to protect its citizens from incoming pollutants
that originated outside of the state's borders. 6 ' Georgia argued that the
suit was based on Georgia's capacity of "quasi-sovereign," and that be-
cause of this capacity, it had an "interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain."6 9 Geor-
gia eloquently articulated its position, noting that "[iut has the last word
as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air. "170
The Court analogized the Tennessee Copper case to Massachusetts
v. EPA, using the century-old rationale to show that Massachusetts had the
same desire as Georgia-the desire to preserve its sovereign territory.171
Moreover, the Court noted that sovereign powers are now vested in the fed-
eral government and, as such, the EPA has a duty to protect Massachusetts
through its ability to formulate regulations that protect the public health
and welfare.'72 Hence, because of the Tennessee Copper decision, the Court
concluded that Massachusetts was able to "retain the dignity" of authority
to sue.7 3 The Court's language in the majority opinion seems to suggest
'6 For additional scholarly commentary on this topic, see F. Andrew Hessick, Standing,
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2008); Christopher L.
Muehlberger, One Man's Conjecture is Another Man's Concrete: Applying the "Injury-in-
Fact" Standing Requirement to Global Warming, 76 UMKC L. REV. 177 (2007); Jonathan
R. Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494 (2008).
167 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
'6 Id. at 236.
169 Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
170 Id.
171 Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
172 id.
171 Id. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (observing that in the federal
system, the states "are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corpo-
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that Massachusetts's stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests en-
titles it to special solicitude in the standing analysis-i.e., the standing
requirements are relaxed for Massachusetts because of its role as a quasi-
sovereign. 1
74
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts stated that just
because Massachusetts is a state alleging an injury, there is no basis or
support for relaxing the requirements of Article III standing in this con-
text.'75 He further noted that there is no support in the majority opinion
for a state's "special solicitude" and that the applicable provision of the
CAA that the Court cites, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), does not grant the states
any special rights or status.'76 The Court stated that through this statutory
provision, Congress ordered the EPA to protect Massachusetts and that
Congress "has... recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge
the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious."177
Justice Roberts acknowledged that with this phrasing, one might
assume that Congress had included express language regarding the rights
of states in that provision of the statute. He carefully noted, however, that
in the provision that the petitioners rely on, "Congress treated public and
private litigants exactly the same." 178 Justice Roberts also stated that the
case law that the majority cited does not offer any support for the idea
that Article III treats public and private litigants differently.' 9 According
to Roberts, while the Court in Tennessee Copper made a distinction be-
tween a State and private litigants, this distinction was only drawn with
respect to available remedies, and had nothing to do with standing.8 °
Justice Roberts also determined that there is nothing about a
State's ability to sue in the capacity of quasi-sovereign that reduces the
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability necessary to satisfy
Article III standing.'' Moreover, Massachusetts's status as a state can-
not make up for a petitioner's inability to adequately show injury in fact,
causation and redressability.8 2 Justice Roberts further noted that the
majority decision eliminated what has always been regarded as a neces-
rations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.").
174Id. at 1454-55.
175 Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
176Id.
177Id.
178 Id. at 1464-65.
179 Id. at 1465.
180 Id.
' Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 n.1.
182Id. at 1466-67.
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sary condition forparenspatriae standing-a quasi-sovereign interest-
and transformed it into a sufficient condition for Article III standing.'83
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, Justice Roberts
stated that the future applicability of the relaxed standing requirements
in Massachusetts v. EPA will be limited because of the Court's recogni-
tion of the "special solicitude" status for Massachusetts. 18 He noted that
the Court's "self-professed relaxation of those Article III requirements has
caused us to transgress 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society.'""' 5 In other words, Roberts believes that
the special solicitude logic is flawed and to the extent that it is now the
rule of law on this topic, it must be limited to the majority's unusual rea-
soning regarding states as plaintiffs and should not be extended beyond
that context.
In the first opportunity to consider the applicability of the special
solicitude aspect of the standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice
Roberts's understanding of the limited applicability of the Court's hold-
ing prevailed. In Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, the
plaintiff, a Canadian trade organization, sued the U.S. in the Court of
International Trade alleging that (1) the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's distribution of duties from imported Canadian goods was an
illegal agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act, and (2) the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act ("CDSOA")
must be interpreted in light of Section 408 of the NAFTA Implementation
Act ("NIA") to not apply to goods from NAFTA countries because it does
not specifically provide that it does apply to NAFTA countries.'86
The U.S. entered the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") with Canada and Mexico in 1992.187 In 2000, Congress enacted
the CDSOA, which changed the trade laws by requiring that "antidumping
and countervailing duties assessed on imported goods-which had pre-
viously been placed into the general fund of the [U.S.] Treasury-would
instead be 'distributed on an annual basis ... to the affected domestic pro-
ducers for qualifying expenditures. 18 8 Consequently, the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection ("Customs") started distributing duties assessed on
"" Id. at 1466.
'84 Id. at 1471.
'
85 Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737,750 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
'86 517 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
117 Id. at 1325.
'
88 Id. at 1324.
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imported goods to domestic producers, including those on goods imported
from NAFTA countries like Canada and Mexico.8 9 Customs had to give the
antidumping duties it collected to domestic producers harmed by the anti-
competitive conduct instead of keeping the money within the government.
The Court of International Trade held that the Canadian producers
had standing, but the Canadian Government did not because it had pre-
vailed on the merits in this matter in a World Trade Organization ("WTO")
proceeding on this matter. 90 The court issued a declaratory judgment that
the CDSOA did not apply to Canada or Mexico and granted an injunction
to stop Customs from further distributing the duties collected on soft-
wood lumber, magnesium, and hard red spring wheat from Canada."'9 The
U.S. Government and domestic producers appealed, and the Canadian
Government cross-appealed the judgment against it and dismissal of its
claims for lack of standing.'92
On appeal, the U.S. and domestic producers claimed that the Cana-
dian producers did not establish a concrete and particularized, imminent
injury in fact because they did not provide an empirical analysis that linked
certain CDSOA distributions to specific economic harms.'93 The Appellate
Court disagreed and concluded that a plaintiff can show injury in fact "in
the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof."'94 The Canadian producers only had to show that it was more
probable than not that they would be injured by the CDSOA distributions
they challenged, which could be done by using simple economic logic, even
if an empirical analysis might have provided more certainty. 9 '
The U.S. and domestic producers also contended that since the
North Dakota Wheat Commission had not yet spent the money distrib-
uted to them, that any injury to the Canadian producers is not imminent
as required by Article III.196 Again, the appellate court disagreed and
stated that the U.S. cannot rely on the pendency of the lawsuit to argue
that the threatened harm is not imminent.'97 Customs' distribution of
189 Id.
" Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1349, 1352
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2006).
191 Canadian Lumber, 517 F.3d at 1325.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1332.1 Id. at 1333.
195 Id.
19 Id. at 1334.
197 Canadian Lumber, 517 F.3d at 1334.
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money to the North Dakota Wheat Commission under the CDSOA was
likely to cause an economic injury to the Canadian producers, and because
this injury is preventable through a declaratory judgment and injunction
against distribution, the Court of International Trade was correct to hold
that the Canadian producers had standing.19
While the Court of International Trade concluded that the Canadian
Government did not have standing because it decided to challenge the
CDSOA in the WTO and was successful in that forum, the Appellate Court
reached the same conclusion (no standing) but for different reasons. 199
The Canadian Government asserted three theories of standing, but the
appellate court deemed all three insufficient under Article III.2"'
First, the Canadian Government asserted that it suffered injury
from the denial of its statutorily granted rights under Section 408 of the
NIA. Canada relied on Massachusetts v. EPA to assert that Congress en-
acted an analogous procedural right in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4), under which
Canada has standing to enforce Section 408 of the NIA.2 °  In Massachusetts
v. EPA, however, the Supreme Court explained that states are not normal
litigants for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction and that the re-
sult depended greatly on the special status and position of Massachusetts
in its quasi-sovereign capacity.2 °2 The Government of Canada is not fairly
analogous to a state and has not surrendered any sovereign prerogatives.
Therefore, the court concluded that the Government of Canada was not
entitled to the quasi-sovereign "special solicitude" that Massachusetts was
deemed to possess in Massachusetts v. EPA.2 °3
The Canadian Government's second theory involved analogizing
itself to a Native American tribe. It argued that it had standing because
it is a sovereign trying to protect its sovereign interests.2 4 But whatever
special solicitude Native American tribes are entitled to regarding stand-
ing, the court held that the Canadian Government failed to establish that
it is similarly situated.2 5
Finally, the Canadian Government argued that even if its sover-
eignty does not grant it special status for standing, Canada has still been
198 Id.
i99Id. at 1335.200 Id. at 1336.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1337.
203 Canadian Lumber, 517 F.3d at 1337.
204Id.
205 Id.
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denied the benefit of Section 408 and is "as entitled as an individual or
corporation to challenge regulatory action that interferes with enjoyment
of bargained-for benefits."206 The problem with this theory is that the
Canadian Government did not specify what benefit it has been deprived
of; it failed to explain what injury it has suffered. °7 Since the Canadian
Government did not show an injury in fact independent of injury to the
Canadian producers, and it is not entitled to special solicitude that would
mitigate the injury in fact requirement, the court concluded that the
Canadian Government lacked Article III standing to challenge Customs'
interpretation of the CDSOA. °s
Therefore, Justice Roberts's view prevailed in that Massachusetts
v. EPA was construed very narrowly in the Canadian Lumber case.2' The
notion of "state" solicitude was not extended to another type of sovereign
entity-the Canadian Government. It remains unsettled, however, as to
whether courts will refuse to extend the majority's special solicitude
standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA to provide a more expansive
interpretation of risk-based standing for individuals in the climate change
litigation context. Roberts maintained that there is no difference between
state standing and private individuals' standing under Article III. Drawing
on that logic, the majority decision's "flawed" logic in finding standing for
Massachusetts on those facts could be extended to private litigants in
future cases. In Roberts's view, this would be a case of "two wrongs don't
make a right," but as long as the majority opinion remains good law, such
an outcome would be a fair reading of the current state of environmental
standing jurisprudence for climate change litigation.
206/Id.
207Id.
20 1 Id. at 1338.
209 The D.C. Circuit, in Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, reached the same conclusion in a
case that involved a private plaintiff, but did not address the climate change context. See
489 F.3d 1279, 1294 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See also Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing
in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273, 294 (2007)
(arguing that Massachusetts's sovereign status is essential to understanding the scope
of the Court's standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA). For additional commentary
on the scope and meaning of the special solicitude of states analysis in Massachusetts v.
EPA, see Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary
Citizens? Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1701 (2008); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA,
112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2007); Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to
Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96
GEO. L.J. 1059 (2008).
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B. New Directions in Recent Climate Change Litigation
Two pending climate change disputes illustrate a potentially expan-
sive and a potentially restrictive view, respectively, of standing analysis
in climate change litigation in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA. In
Native Village ofKivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, the plaintiffs sued
to recover damages from global warming impacts caused by defendants'
actions.210 The plaintiff residents of the village, the Inupiat Eskimos, al-
leged that global warming is destroying their village through the melting
of Arctic sea ice that previously protected the village from winter storms.2 '
The plaintiffs filed this public nuisance212 action under federal
common law, and alternatively under state common law, seeking dam-
ages for defendants' contributions to global warming, the effects of which
are causing severe harms to the village.213 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants, several major petroleum companies, are responsible for emit-
ting large quantities of greenhouse gases that trap heat and directly con-
tribute to global warming, and that they have done so for many years.2 1 4
The resulting global warming is causing the Arctic Sea ice to melt, which
previously protected the village from winter storms. As a result, storm
damage has increased and has resulted in massive erosion.215 This ero-
sion has caused the houses and buildings in the village to be in immedi-
ate danger of falling into the sea and, if the entire village is not relocated
soon, the imminent threat of permanent destruction will become real.216
210 Complaint, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. C08-01138-SBA, at
1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008).
211 Id.
212 To date, courts have been unreceptive to public nuisance theories seeking recovery for
climate change impacts; however, appeals are pending. See, e.g., California v. Gen.
Motors Corp., No. C06-05755MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (public
nuisance suit against several major automobile manufacturers); Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (public nuisance suit against several
major power plants). For further examination of the viability of public nuisance suits for
climate change impacts, see Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate
Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global Warming
Solution" in California, 40 CONN. L. REv. 591 (2008); Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences:
Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77 (2007).
23 Complaint, supra note 210, at 1.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1-2.
211 Id. at 2.
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The plaintiffs claimed that they suffer special injuries that differ
in severity and type from injuries suffered by the general public.217 The
thickness, extent, and duration of sea ice that forms along Kivalina's
coast is affected by the rising temperatures caused by global warming.21
Kivalina's coast is more vulnerable to waves, storm surges, and erosion
due to the loss of sea ice.219 The plaintiffs have contributed little or noth-
ing to global warming and the impact of global warming on the plaintiffs
is "more certain and severe than on others in the general population."22 °
The plaintiffs asserted that by contributing to global warming, the
defendants' carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions consti-
tute a "substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights, in-
cluding, inter alia, the rights to use and enjoy public and private property
in Kivalina."22' Moreover, the plaintiffs have suffered special injuries from
the defendants' emissions in that global warming will lessen or destroy the
plaintiffs' public and private real property.222 The plaintiffs' entire village
has to be relocated as a result of this public nuisance, which will cost mil-
lions of dollars.223 The defendants' emissions are a "direct and proximate
contributing cause of global warming" and of the plaintiffs' injuries and
threatened injuries. 4 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants knew
or should have known that their emissions would contribute to global
warming-and consequently to injuries incurred by the general public and
special injuries by Plaintiffs-but either "[i ntentionally or negligently...
created, contributed to, and/or maintained the public nuisance."2 5 The
plaintiffs have been injured and will continue to be injured by global warm-
ing, but do not have the economic ability to avoid or prevent the harm.226
217 Id. at 45.
2 1 8 
Id.
219 Complaint, supra note 210, at 1.
220 Id. at 46.
221 Id. at 62.
222Id.
223 Id. at 63.
224 Id.
225 Complaint, supra note 210, at 63.
226 Id. A similar theory of relief failed in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
436-LG-RHW, slip op. (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007). Several Mississippi property owners
sued various insurers, oil companies, chemical companies, and coal companies for their
greenhouse emissions. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' emissions contributed
to global warming, which in turn increased the water temperature in the Gulf of Mexico,
and consequently increased the severity and frequency ofhurricanes, including Katrina.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims, alleging that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. The district court's standing analysis focused on the difficulty of establishing
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At the opposite end of the spectrum of recent developments in
climate change litigation is an effort by the Pacific Legal Foundation
("PLF") to reel in the potentially extreme effects of enhanced procedural
standing available from the recent listing of the polar bear as threatened
under the ESA.221 On May 15, 2008, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") listed the polar bear as threatened under the ESA.22' This listing
makes the polar bear the first species given ESA protection due to global
warming. PLF opposes the FWS's listing decision because it was based on
predictions about future trends in global warming and is likely to lead to
destructive economic impacts, such as severe restrictions on land use, job
creation, and economic activity in Alaska as well as the lower forty-eight
states.229
Because the PLF believes the listing of the polar bear falls short
of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act standards, it has submitted
a 60-day notice of intent to sue to the FWS.23° Major points of the 60-day
notice include: the claim of "threatened" status is not supported by sea ice
models; threatened status is not supported by current polar bear demo-
graphics; the government impermissibly relies on anecdotal evidence in
supporting its listing decision; and the listing is arbitrary because the
government admits the polar bear is already protected.23'
The citizen suit provision of the ESA authorizes citizens to sue
private individuals and government agencies for alleged violations of the
Act.232 Therefore, PLF fears that environmentalists would, for example,
be able to sue the EPA to compel it to "issue regulations substantially re-
stricting car emissions, on the theory that those emissions contribute to
that the property damage that the plaintiffs suffered was traceable to the defendants'
conduct. The court held that although the defendants' emissions contributed to climate
change, the plaintiffs lacked standing because their losses could be attributed to a group
larger than that comprised of the defendants. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
on several grounds, including standing. An appeal is pending. Id., appeal docketed, No. 07-
60756 (5th Cir. 2007).
227 See M. David Stirling, Polar Bears and Melting Ice, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008.
' Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout
Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
2 See Stirling, supra note 227.
0 Pacific Legal Foundation, 60-Day Notice of Intent to Sue for Violations of Section 4 of
the Endangered Species Act in Connection with: Determination of Threatened Status for
the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout its Range: Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212
(May 15, 2008) (filed July 23, 2008), available at http'J/community.pacificlegal.org/NET
COMMUNITY/Document.Doc?id=138.
"
1 See id.
232 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
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climate change and reduce the polar bear's habitat."2 33 This scenario
would place the courts in a familiar but dangerous position-being called
upon to step into the shoes of the legislative and executive branches "to
decide whether man-made greenhouse gases cause global warming. "234
In Massachusetts v. EPA, even though the Supreme Court ruled that
Massachusetts could bring such a suit, the Court also cautioned that it
lacked the expertise and authority to engage in policy decisions that are
better addressed by the political branches, particularly by the EPA.235
Taken together, the Kivalina and PLF cases underscore an essential
and recurring policy consideration in this new era of environmental stand-
ingjurisprudence: the need to ensure that Article III standing requirements
do not become diluted such that the court will be flooded with matters
that are better addressed by the legislative or executive branches. The
PLF case is a valuable reminder that an expansive view of environmental
standing, even when promoting seemingly laudable objectives, can have
devastating effects on the economy, and even on other environmental re-
sources, at the expense of the resource in question. ESA litigation has dem-
onstrated that the effect of a species listing under the Act can be akin to a
trump card over other societal interests, including major federal projects 6
and private business interests. 237 An expansive view of environmental
standing in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA could give environmental
organizations too much authority to command government and private
sector actors to elevate the interests of the polar bear over other important
economic and environmental interests.
Although climate change science remains less than certain, there
has been a rising tide of clarity about the links between human-caused
carbon dioxide emissions and the climate change impacts felt by vulnerable
sectors of our society, such as polar bears and indigenous peoples. Cases like
Kivalina are important to ensure that climate change impacts on vulnerable
populations are detected and addressed. The problem with responding to
" See Damien Schiff, 'Endangered' Polar Bear Is Trotted Out As the Extremists' Latest
Trojan Horse, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 25, 2008.2 3 Id.
235 Id.
236 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 213-15 (1973).
237 See N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (ordering a
remand to FWS until its decision to declare the Northern Spotted Owl an endangered
species was not arbitrary or capricious); N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan 758 F. Supp. 621, 629-
30 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (ordering another remand); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants; Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg.
1796 (Jan. 15, 1992) (creating the final rule in the manner ordered by the court).
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the plight of the polar bears and indigenous peoples through the court sys-
tem, however, is that it often leads to a race to find deep-pocket scapegoats
to hold accountable for the environmental perils at issue, which is not a
viable long-term solution to any problem. Until the Massachusetts v. EPA
decision is implemented, however, these opportunities to use the courts for
publicity about these concerns-and as a mechanism to apply pressure to
goad appropriate action from the legislative and executive branches-is
a valuable step in the right direction.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING GENERALLY
The principal issues that have been the focus of the lower federal
courts' decisions interpreting the environmental standing implications
of Massachusetts v. EPA are how to determine the appropriate scope and
applicability of both the procedural injury and the increased risk of future
harm standards for environmental standing. This part of the Article eval-
uates recent developments in these areas and considers the application
of risk assessment principles to address the gaps and concerns in these
two areas.
A. Procedural Injury
After the EPA implements the Massachusetts v. EPA mandate,
procedural injury will be a more significant mechanism through which
future litigants may assert standing to challenge climate change impacts
under the CAA. The geographical nexus component of the procedural in-
jury test adds a dimension of substantive injury flavor to the procedural
injury framework. Plaintiffs must assert a narrowly tailored localized
harm that is fairly traceable to the government action or inaction for which
the court can provide a remedy. For example, residents of New Jersey
cannot successfully assert a procedural injury claim against a defendant
whose failure to obtain a CAA permit for a stationary source has increased
the risk of harm from increased air pollution to residents of a town in
Idaho that live near the source.
A series of recent cases illustrate the current state and possible
future of procedural injury analysis in environmental standing cases.
For example, in South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. South Carolina
Department of Transportation, the defendants planned construction of
a highway connector to link two towns in South Carolina."~ The connector
485 F. Supp. 2d 661, 667 (D.S.C. 2007).
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included "three mile-long bridges through the Upper Santee Swamp. "239
The plaintiffs claimed that the "connector will have significant negative
effects on the environmental ly sensitive area] surrounding the Swamp,"
which is home to significant wildlife habitat.24 °
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to correct problems
that were detected in its draft environmental impact statement under
NEPA.24' Such problems included "an impermissibly narrow purpose and
need statement, a failure to [sufficiently] consider alternatives, and a fail-
ure to adequately" evaluate the environmental impacts resulting from
the project.242
In evaluating the plaintiffs' standing, the court noted that a
plaintiff cannot show injury in fact simply by showing an agency's failure
to follow a procedural statute; plaintiffs must show that "they would be
personally injured in some individualized and particularized way by the
defendant's actions."243 "The injury in fact requirement includes harm to
'aesthetic, conservational, recreational,' as well as economic values."2 "
In the present case, the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated injury in
fact by showing "that construction of the connector will harm the educa-
tional, scientific, recreational, and aesthetic benefits their members enjoy
when using the ... Swamp," which are recognized interests for standing
purposes.' Moreover, each plaintiff organization presented information
to show "that at least one of its members currently uses and enjoys the
area where the connector would be constructed."246
Regarding the traceability element, the court held that the plaintiffs
adequately demonstrated that the proposed construction of the connector
"would cause injury to their members' interest in enjoying the surrounding
environment."247 The plaintiffs asserted that the connector would result
in destruction and fragmentation of natural habitat, increased traffic and
traffic noise from vehicles traveling on the connector, "degradation of
water quality,.., land use changes," damage to the "natural landscape,"
and disruption of "bird activity in the area."248 In addition, to satisfy this
239Id.
2 Id.
241 Id. at 668.
242 id.
Id. at 669.
S.C. Wildlife Federation, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
246 Id.
2A7 Id. at 670.
24 Id.
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element, the "plaintiffs' injuries must flow from some action taken by
the defendants, and not some 'absent third party.'"249 Here, the plaintiffs
properly alleged that the "defendants' involvement in the project... con-
tributed to their potential injuries." 5 °
On the redressability element, the "plaintiffs must show that
their injuries can be redressed by obtaining relief against the state agency
and its executive director."25' "The Supreme Court has stated that when
Congress grants a procedural right to protect concrete interests, a litigant
asserting that procedural right does not have to meet all of the 'normal
standards' for redressability and immediacy."252 The plaintiffs must only
"prove that 'there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt
the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision.'"" The South Carolina
Department of Transportation will have an important role in correcting
any deficiencies in the NEPA process.254 The plaintiffs have met the re-
dressability standard from Massachusetts v. EPA because requiring the
defendants to re-evaluate the environmental impacts of the project and to
reconsider more environmentally friendly alternatives could likely encour-
age the defendants to alter or forego the decision to build the connector.255
Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs met all three elements
to properly establish standing. 56
The geographical nexus component of procedural injury analysis
remains a viable consideration in post-Massachusetts v. EPA procedural
injury cases. In Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation, the court
considered "whether [the Department of Transportation] (DOT) was re-
quired to perform an environmental assessment (EA) under... the Hawaii
Environmental Policy Act (HEPA) before approving various harbor improve-
ments and permits associated with the Hawaii Superferry project."257 In
its proposal to develop and operate a new high speed ferry service, Hawaii
Superferry, Inc. determined that it needed to make several improvements
to the Kahului Harbor "to accommodate the Superferry project."25 HEPA
249 Id.250 S.C. Wildlife Federation, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
251 Id.
1 2 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA., 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007)).
253 Id.
2uId. at 671.
255 Id.
' S.C. Wildlife Federation, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 669-71.
25 167 P.3d 292, 297 (Haw. 2007).
m Id. at 298.
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requires that environmental impact review be undertaken for develop-
ment projects meeting certain criteria.5 9
The plaintiffs claimed to have standing on two grounds: traditional
standing and procedural standing.2' To satisfy the injury prong of the
standing analysis, the plaintiff must assert a judicially recognized injury
to some legally protected interest. The court has recognized a variety of
interests which injured, can form the basis for standing.26'" In environmen-
tal cases,... recreational and aesthetic interests have been acknowledged
as forming the basis for... standing." 2 Although "plaintiffs must show that
some environment-related interest was injured, the ultimate inquiry de-
pends on injury to the plaintiffs themselves [and] not the environment.2"
In addressing procedural injury, the court noted that the procedural
standing doctrine was recently reaffirmed in Massachusetts v. EPA.2 s4
Several tests have been developed "to determine whether a plaintiff has
established standing based on a procedural injury."26 While these tests
modify the way in which the traditional three-part standing test is met,
they still require the plaintiff to show an injury which is fairly traceable to
the defendant's actions and which is likely to be remedied by court action.
66
The three important features of procedural standing doctrine are
that it is based on a specific characterization of a plaintiffs injury, such
as the denial of some procedures required by law; that the plaintiff has
been given a procedural right, which focuses on the statutory framework
in question; and that there needs to be a nexus between the plaintiffs
procedural right and an underlying concrete interest.267 These features
may be demonstrated by showing a "geographical nexus" to the site at
issue and"that the procedural violation increases the risk of harm to the
plaintiffs concrete interests."26 8
In the present case, the plaintiffs claimed that DOT violated HEPA
by approving an exemption from the requirement to prepare an environ-
mental assessment and caused injury to the plaintiffs' interests in several
ways: potential adverse impacts to endangered species caused by high-
259 Id. at 299.
260 Id. at 311.261 1d. at 314.
262Id.
2 Sierra Club, 167 P.3d 292 at 315.
264/d.
265 !d.
266Id. at 315-16.
26 7 Id. at 318.
26 8 Id. at 322.
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speed ferries; threatened increase in the introduction of foreign species
through the execution of the Superferry project; adverse impacts to recre-
ational interests of members who use the harbor for surfing, diving, and
canoeing; and adverse traffic impacts caused by the Superferry project.269
Under the traditional injury in fact test, a threatened injury may
be demonstrated based on direct personal interests in the site of a project
coupled with concerns of actual injury if the project were to proceed without
sufficient environmental review.270 The plaintiffs' concrete interests were
threatened by the decision to exempt the harbor improvements from the
environmental review process.27' The plaintiffs established that members
of their groups have concrete interests in the Kahului Harbor area and the
Superferry's operation there and that if the project were allowed to proceed
without an EA, the risk of harm to those interests would increase.272 Here,
there also can be procedural standing for members of the public under
HEPA because it is a procedural statute that accords procedural rights
to parties who wish to challenge nonconformity with its requirements.273
The causation and redressability elements are more easily satis-
fied. The causation element is established if a plaintiff can "show its in-
creased risk is fairly traceable to the defendant's failure to comply with
HEPA."274 Here, the plaintiffs established causation because the injuries
they alleged are traceable to DOT exempting Superferry from preparing
an EA. Regarding the redressability prong, a plaintiffwho asserts the in-
adequacy of a government's environmental studies does not need to show
that further analysis by the government would result in a different con-
clusion. 275 When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant
can satisfy the redressability element if there is some possibility that the
requested relief will encourage the injury-causing party to reconsider the
decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.276 Redressability was estab-
lished in this case because the threat of increased risk of harm is redress-
able by preparing an EA, which would permit the plaintiffs' threatened
injuries to be addressed and possibly mitigated or avoided.277
269 Sierra Club, 167 P.3d 292 at 321-22.
270 Id. at 322.
27 Id. at 323.
272 id.
273 id.
274 Id. at 324.
275 Sierra Club, 167 P.3d 292 at 324.
6 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007)).
277 Id.
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The role of statutorily authorized public participation is critical
in considering procedural standing. Center for Biological Diversity v.
Brennan involved a procedural injury challenge to the Global Change
Research Act ("GCRA). 2 vs Enacted in 1990, the GCRA initiated a ten-
year research program for global climate issues, instructed the President
to set up a research program to improve people's understanding of global
change, and required the preparation of evaluations every four years that
scrutinize current trends in global change.27 9 The GCRA was enacted "to
provide for development and coordination of a comprehensive and inte-
grated United States research program which will assist the Nation and
the world to understand, assess, predict, and respond to human-induced
and natural processes of global change."2"'
To fulfill this objective, the GCRA requires a National Global
Change Research Plan ("Research Plan"), which must include recommen-
dations for objectives and priorities for federal global change research that
would most successfully develop scientific understanding of global change
and provide usable information on which policy decisions regarding global
change may be based, and a Scientific Assessment analyzing global climate
change effects.2"' The initial Research Plan was to be submitted to Congress
within one year of the GCRA's enactment, with a revised Research Plan
to be submitted at least once every three years thereafter.282
In this case, the defendants did not prepare a new Research Plan
or Scientific Assessment within the time frame set by the GCRA.2" 3 The
plaintiffs sued to declare the defendants in violation of the GCRA and com-
pel the defendants to issue the Research Plan and Scientific Assessment
as directed by the statute.2" The defendants asserted that they had al-
ready commenced the process to produce the revised Research Plan and
Scientific Assessment and that, "regardless of whether they have acted
in a timely manner,.., the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for enforce-
ment of the GCRA or to compel the production of the Research Plan and
Scientific Assessment."28 5 The defendants contended that "because the
27 No. C 06-7062 SBA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2007).
279 Id. at **2-3.
000 Id. at *3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2931(b) (1990)).
28' Id. at *3.
2 82 Id. at *4.
2M1 id.
Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *6.
'SId. at *7.
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GCRA does not contain 'a citizen suit' provision, the Act does not allow
third-party, private organizations" like the plaintiffs to enforce it.28 6
The plaintiffs alleged both procedural injury, due to the lack of
public participation and comment on the development of the Research
Plan and the Scientific Assessment, as well as informational injury, re-
sulting from the defendants' failure to disseminate these reports. 287 To
satisfy the injury in fact element, a plaintiff asserting a procedural injury
must show that the questioned procedures are made to protect some threat-
ened concrete interest and the reasonable likelihood that the challenged
action is a threat to his or her concrete interest.2 8 If the defendants do not
develop a Research Plan within the time allotted by the GCRA, then the
plaintiffs suffer the loss of consultation and public comment.2 9 This pro-
cedural injury would cause a corresponding loss of feedback regarding
the results of the program, which makes it hard "to ensure that such re-
sults are useful in developing national and international policy responses
to global change."29
0
The defendants maintained that because the public involvement
in the Research Plan is less extensive than in other statutes, the plaintiffs
are not entitled to the Research Plan.291' The court, however, rejected this
argument.292 The defendants further asserted that public participation is
only required if and when "the defendants produce a Research Plan."293
The court also found this argument unpersuasive because this reasoning
suggests that if the defendants never produce a Research Plan, the plain-
tiffs never have a right to partake in consultation or public comment and
therefore never suffer a procedural injury.294 The GCRA imposes an affir-
mative duty for the defendants to produce the Research Plan periodically;
therefore, public participation is not a contingency that can be deferred
for an indefinite period.295 The court concluded that the plaintiffs demon-
strated a procedural injury for standing purposes with respect to the
Research Plan.296
6 Id. at **7-8.
.7 Id. at *9.
m Id. at **9-10.
2s Id. at *12.
'Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *'12-13.
2911 Id. at *13.
2 2 Id. at **13-14.
293MI. at *14.
2'Id. at **14-15.
295 Id. at *15.
9 Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *15.
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The court also concluded that the plaintiffs established a proce-
dural injury with respect to the Scientific Assessment. The Scientific
Assessment is supposed to "integrate, evaluate, and interpret the find-
ings of the Program," which is implemented by the Research Plan.297 The
Research Plan provides for public participation, so if there is no consulta-
tion or comment period while developing the Research Plan, the Scientific
Assessment will not integrate, evaluate and interpret the findings of the
Program as required.29 Consequently, an indirect opportunity for public
participation exists in the preparation of the Scientific Assessment and
therefore a procedural injury results from the lack of this participation.299
The defendants asserted that the connection between the Research
Plan and the Assessment is too remote to support standing.0 0 They main-
tained that any connection between the "[pilaintiffs' alleged injury resulting
from their lack of opportunity to comment on a revised Research Plan and
the allegedly delayed submission of the Scientific Assessment to Congress
is too attenuated to support standing."30' The defendants further contended
that because Congress does not have to fully adopt the recommendations
of the Research Plan and is able to set its own priorities in funding re-
search, there is really no concrete injury to the plaintiffs.30 2 However,
there is nothing in the statute that guarantees that any comments will be
ultimately adopted as policy. The statute only guarantees that the public
has a right to "participate in the process."30 3 Even if the plaintiffs' comments
are ultimately rejected, the GCRA considers the fact that public partici-
pation will at least inform the two end products of the Act: the Research
Plan and the Scientific Assessment.3? 4 Therefore, the court concluded that
plaintiffs have sufficiently asserted a procedural injury with regards to the
Scientific Assessment.30 5
297 Id.
2 98Id. at **15-16.
298Id. at *16.300 Id. at *19.
301 Id.
302 Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at **19-20.
303 Id. at *20.
304 Id.
5 Id. at *20. The plaintiffs also asserted an informational injury as another premise
upon which to base their standing to sue under the GCRA. Id. Courts recognize that a
plaintiff may suffer injury as a result of a denial of information to which they are entitled
by statute. Id. The defendants contended that there is a difference between statutes order-
ing certain information to be made available to the public in general and those requiring
only reporting to Congress, which are not subject to judicial review. Id. Brennan, 2007
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To establish standing by asserting procedural harm, the plaintiffs
only have to show "that they have a procedural right that, if exercised,
could protect their concrete interests, and that those interests fall within
the zone of those interests being protected by the statute at issue. "36 The
zone of interests test is usually satisfied unless the plaintiffs' interests
are so vaguely related to or inconsistent with the purposes implied in the
statute that it cannot be reasonably assumed that Congress meant to al-
low the suit.3 °7 Here, the plaintiffs are three environmental groups whose
members are concerned about the effects of human activity on global
warming, and the consequences of global warming on the environment. °8
The plaintiffs asserted that their injuries resulted from their concerns
that global warming will detrimentally affect the environment and the
health and well-being of its members, and that poorly informed agency
decisions will further contribute to global warming or insufficiently react
to its challenges. 3 9 The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants' failure
to prepare the required reports interferes with the plaintiffs' members' re-
search and observation of species that are affected by climate change.31 °
A threatened recreational interest in a certain place, animal, or plant
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *21. The Research Plan requires the publication of a summary
and the chance for public comments, which is more than merely reporting to Congress. Id.
The purpose of publishing this summary is to invite substantive public comments and
recommendations, and for this information to be considered when drafting the final
version of the Research Plan. Id. at *22. The plaintiffs have a statutory right to a
summary of the plan under review and a chance to offer comments on the substance of
that anticipated plan. Id. If no summary of the plan is published, then the plaintiffs have
suffered an informational injury. Id.
With respect to the Scientific Assessment, there does not appear to be a similar
informational injury, as it contains no provision for public disclosure. Id. However, "the
plaintiffs insisted the Scientific Assessment is required to be made public and to be subject
to public comment under the Climate Change Science Program's 2003 Research Plan and
Guidelines." Id. While this may be true, "the court does not have the authority to enforce
these guidelines [because they do not] have the force and effect of law," as they were not
promulgated in accordance with the notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Id. at **24-25. Because these guidelines do not have the force
of law, the defendants' noncompliance with them does not trigger a legally recognized infor-
mational injury. Id. at *26. Therefore, the court concluded that "the plaintiffs [established]
both a procedural injury and informational injury with respect to the Research Plan," and
a procedural but not informational injury for the Scientific Assessment. Id. at **26-27.
3o6 Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *27.307 Id. at **27-28.
308 Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, *28.
309 Id.310 Id. at **28-29.
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species has been shown to satisfy the injury element of standing; conse-
quently, the desire to use or observe a species for research purposes is
also a legally recognized interest for standing purposes.311
Congress enacted the GCRA to provide for development and
coordination of a comprehensive and integrated U.S. research program
that will help the nation and the world understand, evaluate, predict, and
respond to the human caused and natural processes of global change." 2
Therefore, the plaintiffs' interests are connected to the purposes of the
GCRA.313 The plaintiffs also have a procedural right to participate in devel-
opment of a research plan regarding global climate change.1 4 "That right,
if exercised, could protect their concrete interests [, which] fall within the
zone of interests protected by the GCRA."1 5
Regarding the traceability and redressability elements of standing,
a plaintiff asserting inadequacy of a government agency's environmental
studies does not need to show that more analysis by the government
would permit them to reach a different conclusion; rather, it is sufficient
"that the agency's decision could be influenced by the environmental
considerations that the related statute requires an agency to consider or
evaluate."1 6 In the present case, issuing a Research Plan could result in
a decision favorable to the plaintiffs' interests; the defendants' failure to
produce the required reports undermines the plaintiffs' participation in
the process and the possibility of influencing environmental policy.31 7
Therefore, the plaintiffs' procedural injuries can be directly connected to
the defendants' failure to produce a revised Research Plan and Scientific
Assessment, and injunctive relief would remedy these injuries.31 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs have sufficiently established Article III standing
to pursue their claims dealing with these reports.319
Procedural injury claims have been and will continue to be closely
intertwined with substantive injury claims. In Association of Irritated
Residents v. C & R Vanderham Dairy, the plaintiff organization's mem-
bers asserted physical, aesthetic and procedural harms, all of which can
311 Id. at **30-31.312 Id. at **31-32.
313 Id. at *32.
314 Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *32.
315 Id.
316 Id. at *33.317 Id. at **33-34.
31' Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65456, at *34.
319 Id.
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satisfy the injury in fact requirement.32 ° The defendant's facility emitted
VOC, which reacts with oxides of nitrogen emissions to form ozone in the
air basin where the president of the organization resides.32' The organiza-
tion's president breathed the air that contained the ozone, which harmed
him, and he suffered from breathing difficulties that were worsened by the
ozone pollution.322 Furthermore, ozone pollution harms the president's
aesthetic interest because it interferes with his view of the mountains,
which he has enjoyed since childhood.323 The defendant's failure to get
a pre-construction permit has also deprived the organization's president
and its members of procedural rights, which is an independent basis for
standing.3 24 Since the organization's president also demonstrated a con-
crete interest at stake-ozone-polluted air, these procedural failures also
establish injury in fact.325
The physical, aesthetic, and procedural harms are linked to the
defendant's illegal conduct in failing to obtain a pre-construction permit
and comply with pollution control requirements.326 A favorable order by
the court will redress the injuries because it will force defendant to get
a permit, reduce the air pollution, and buy offsets which will ultimately
reduce the ozone-producing VOC in the valley.327
The potentially most significant development in this line of post-
Massachusetts v. EPA procedural standing cases occurred in Earth Island
Institute v. Ruthenbeck.328 Prior to 1992, the defendant U.S. Forest Service
offered a "post-decision administrative appeals process for agency decisions
documented in a decision memo, decision notice or record of decision."329
In March 1992, however, the Forest Service proposed a new regulation to
replace the post-decision administrative appeals for every decision-
except decisions approving forest plans, or amendments or revisions to
forest plans-with pre-decision notice and comment procedures for pro-
posed projects on which the Forest Service had conducted environmental
120 Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. C & R Vanderham Dairy, No. 1:05-CV-01593, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 70890, at *35 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2007).
321 Id. at *36.
322 id.
3231 d. at **36-37.
324 Id. at *37.
325 id.
321 Irritated Residents, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70890, at *38.
3 17 Id. at *39.
3
' Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub. nom.,
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 77 U.S.L.W. 3027 (July 15, 2008) (No. 07-463).
329 Id. at 691.
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impact review in accordance with NEPA."3 ° Projects that the Forest
Service considered environmentally insignificant would be exempt from
notice, comment, and appeal pursuant to this proposed regulation.33'
After considering concerns from environmental groups contesting
the loss of administrative review, the Forest Service published"a final
rule revising the notice, comment, and appeal procedures for 'projects
and activities' implementing land and resource management plans on
National Forest System lands," and "the final implementing procedures
for National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire
Management Activities." 32 The latter established two new categorical
exclusions-fire rehabilitation on areas less than 4200 acres and salvage
timber sales of 250 acres or less, that could be omitted from NEPA analy-
sis and excused from "notice, comment and appeal under the challenged
regulations."3 3
On September 8, 2003, the Forest Service released its Burnt Ridge
Project decision memo approving the logging and sale of timber from 238
acres of forest that had been burned in a 2002 fire. 34 This decision memo
applied one of the categorical exclusions and expressly stated that the
"project is not subject to appeal because it involves projects or activities
which are categorically excluded from documentation in an environmental
impact statement or environmental assessment."335
The plaintiff Earth Island Institute sued to challenge the 2003 Rule
as it applied to the Burnt Ridge Project. a33 The Forest Service claimed that
the memo was released under provisions that categorically excluded the
project from NEPA documentation and from administrative notice, com-
ment, and appeal. 37
While the Forest Service maintained that the plaintiff has no
legally recognized injury in fact with respect to the challenged statute
because the regulations have not been applied yet, Earth Island con-
tended that "their aesthetic interests in the national forests are harmed
by the regulations," and "their procedural interests in participating in
the administrative notice, comment, and appeal process are harmed."338
330Id.
331 Id.332 Id. at 692.
333 Id.
3 Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 692.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
mId. at 693.
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While legally recognized injury in fact generally includes both aesthetic
and environmental interests, the injury in fact requirement also insists
that "the party seeking review must be himself among the injured."339
Moreover, an affiant's "intentions to return to an area that will be affected
by a project do not support a finding of actual or imminent injury unless
the affiant has specific plans to return to the area."340
In this case, a member of the plaintiffs organization whose affi-
davit plaintiff relied on to establish standing was prevented from partici-
pating in the appeals process, which may cause recreational enjoyment
of the national forests to be reduced. 34' The organization also success-
fully asserted procedural injury because the Appeals Reform Act ("ARA")
is a procedural statute that gives rise to a procedural injury within the
zone of interests that Congress intended to protect. The ARA only gov-
erns the process that provides opportunity for public comment and does
not address any substantive Forest Service program.342 "The procedural
injury implicit in agency failure to prepare an EIS is the creation of a risk
that serious environmental impacts will be overlooked is itself a sufficient
'injury in fact' to support standing .... "3 Since NEPA is a procedural
statute whose purpose is to guarantee that environmental issues receive
appropriate consideration during the decision making process, injury re-
sulting from violations of this procedural right will confer standing."
In this case, the court held that Earth Island Institute's lost right of
administrative appeal through the Forest Service's application of its regu-
lation is a sufficient procedural injury in fact to support standing for it to
challenge the regulation. 345 The ARA is wholly procedural and Congress
anticipated public involvement in the administrative notice, comment, and
appeal process. Since the plaintiff and its members are prevented from
appealing decisions like the Burnt Ridge Project, they are injured in the
way that Congress anticipated and therefore meet the injury in fact
requirement of standing.34 The plaintiffs have also satisfied the remain-
ing elements of traceability and redressability. 31 "The deprivation of the
39 Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1972)).
Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 693 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
(1992)).
341 Id.
U2 id.
'Id. (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975)).
i4 d.
345 Id. at 694.
34 Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 694.
347 id.
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procedural right of administrative notice, comment and appeal is fairly
traceable to the Forest Service's regulations," and "a favorable decision
invalidating the regulation would redress Earth Island's injury."348 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that Earth Island successfully established
standing on the basis of both personal and procedural injury.349
After the EPA implements the Massachusetts v. EPA mandate to
promulgate regulations addressing carbon dioxide as a criteria air pollut-
ant,350 procedural standing under the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision
will be a viable mechanism through which future litigants may challenge
climate change impacts in their respective regions. On July 15, 2008, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Earth Island Institute case,351
which will allow the Court to address procedural injury and the risk of
future harm standard to clarify some of the questions about environmental
standing that linger in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA.
B. Increased Risk of Future Harm
The increased risk of future harm standard is directly related to
the concept of procedural injury; however, the doctrines evolved independ-
ently. Procedural injury traces its origins to statutes with procedural man-
dates like NEPA and the ESA, whereas the increased risk of harm future
standard emerged in the context of substantive injury in evaluating what
it means for a harm to be imminent. Both doctrines are particularly rele-
vant in considering standing for climate change litigation.
A recent case from the D.C. Circuit, Public Citizen, Inc. v. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration,352 illustrates the current status
348 id.
349 Id.
350 As of this writing, the EPA has not implemented the Massachusetts v. EPA decision.
In fact, on April 2, 2008, several states and environmental groups sued the EPA for its
failure to respond to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision. See U.S. EPA Sued for Ignoring
Supreme Court Greenhouse Gas Ruling, ENVTLNEWSSERV., available at http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/apr2008/2008-04-02-01.asp.
35 1 Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub. nom.,
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 77 U.S.L.W. 3027 (July 15,2008) (No. 07-463). For a helpful
discussion of recent case law addressing the increased risk of future harm standard, see
Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry". Pollution Regulation,
Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 149,
188-96 (2007).
352 Public Citizen, Inc. v. Natl Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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of the increased risk of future harm standard and its possible relevance for
climate change cases and environmental standing generally. To combat the
dangerous consequences of under-inflated auto tires, Congress enacted the
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation
Act ('TREAD Act").35 3 Acting through the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), the Secretary of Transportation adopted
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 138, which required automakers
to include an automatic tire pressure monitoring system that signals a
warning when tire pressure falls below a pre-determined level.354
The 130,000-member organization, Public Citizen, along with sev-
eral tire manufacturers and a tire industry trade association, challenged
NHTSA's Standard 138 on the ground that it does not satisfy safety re-
quirements.355 Public Citizen alleged an increased risk of future harm to
its members as its injury in fact.35 6 The organization asserted that under
Standard 138 some of its members will experience car accidents in the
future that could otherwise have been avoided if NHTSA had adopted
Public Citizen's recommendations.357
Public Citizen asserted that its injury is concrete because injuries
from car accidents--death, physical injury, and property damage--"are...
concrete harms under the Supreme Court's precedent."35 Injuries from
car accidents are also particularized because each person in an accident is
harmed personally and distinctly. Moreover, "standing will not be denied
just because many people suffer the same injury." ' The district court con-
cluded that Public Citizen had sufficiently shown a concrete and particu-
larized injury, but it questioned whether Public Citizen's alleged injury
was actual or imminent because Public Citizen only raised remote and
speculative claims of possible future harm to its members. 36" The court
concluded that standing exists when there is at least both a substantially
increased risk of harm and a substantial probability of harm with that
increase considered.36'
353 Id. at 1283.
3M Id. at 1283-84.
311 Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 236-237
(D.C. Cir. 2008).356 Id. at 237.
357 Id.31 Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1292.359 Id. at 1293 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007)).
" Public Citizen, 513 F.3d at 237.
361 Id.
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The district court ordered supplemental information from the parties
to address whether Standard 138, as adopted, creates a more substantial
increase in the risk of death, physical injury, or property loss versus the
version of Standard 138 that Public Citizen has proposed, and whether the
ultimate risk of harm that Public Citizen's members are exposed to is sub-
stantial and sufficient to make it not hypothetical.362 Public Citizen chal-
lenged how the warning system works for replacement tires, the possible
twenty-minute time lapse between tire under-inflation and the onset of
the warning light, and the standard for what constitutes significant under-
inflation."a Public Citizen contended that Standard 138 is inconsistent
with the TREAD Act because it does not require that the system's pres-
sure monitor be compatible with replacement tires.3' The group showed
its statistician's estimate of the difference in risk of injury between a stan-
dard requiring the compatibility of tire pressure monitors with all replace-
ment tires and Standard 138, which is estimated to be incompatible with
between one and ten percent of replacement tires.6 5
However, Public Citizen's submissions ignored the fact that Public
Citizen actually proposed that NHTSA adopt either of two acceptable
alternatives regarding replacement tires.3" Public Citizen is not injured
for standing purposes if Standard 138 threatens no greater risk of injury
than one of Public Citizen's proposed options. The organization made no
attempt to show that its proposal that auto manufacturers publish a list
of compatible tires in the owner's manual would substantially lessen the
risk of death, injury, or property loss to its members when compared with
Standard 138.367 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that it would be dif-
ficult for Public Citizen to establish standing because its asserted injury
results from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation of someone
else.368
C. Risk Assessment
Alleging injury for local impacts of global environmental harms is
highly scientific. Enhanced certainty regarding the scientific data in this
362 Id. at 238.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id.
" Public Citizen, 513 F.3d at 238.367 Id. at 239.
368 Id. at 237.
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context has made injury and causation determinations easier, but chal-
lenges remain. Risk assessment can fill those gaps to keep environmental
standing moving forward.
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA 9 is an illustrative
example of the struggles a court must overcome in determining whether
private citizens have suffered an injury in fact.370 Here, had it not been
for the necessary evaluation of applicable risk assessment analysis to
identify an injury, the case would not have been able to proceed because
of lack of standing.
In the mid 1970s, scientists discovered that certain man-made
chemicals were able to thin and ultimately destroy the ozone layer. As the
ozone thins, it is unable to absorb as much radiation and, in turn, humans
absorb more ultraviolet radiation, which can lead to skin cancer and cata-
racts.37' Due to this alarming evidence, several countries, including the
United States, entered into the Montreal Protocol treaty regime which
required the signatory nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate ozone-
depleting chemicals on a strict timetable.372 The United States immedi-
ately incorporated these changes into the CAA Amendments of 1990 (the
"1990 Amendments").373 However, in 1997, well after the 1990 Amendments
were implemented, the Montreal Protocol called for a phase-out on the use
and consumption of methyl bromide by 2005."' 4 Again, the EPA was re-
quired to change its rules and terminate all production, importation, and
consumption of methyl bromide.375
However, the Montreal Protocol recognized that methyl bromide
is heavily used and had no viable substitutes as a pesticide.376 Therefore,
EPA allowed exemptions to the general prohibition only to the extent that
such use was critical.377 In turn, the EPA began the process of identifying
39 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), reh'g denied, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3965 (Feb. 21,2007).371 See id. The court devoted the majority of its time in the opinion to evaluating NRDC's
standing. Id.
371 Id. at 3.
3721d.
373 id.
374 Id. at 3-4.375 NRDC, 464 F.3d at 3-4.
37 Declaration on Methyl Bromide, in OZONE SECRETARIAT-UNITED NATIONS
ENvIRONMENT PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES
THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER (7th ed. 2006), available at httpJ/ozone.unep.org/
Publications/MPHandbook/Section3.8_AnnexesDeclarations/Declaration onMeBr
.shtml.377 NRDC, 464 F.3d at 4.
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all the critical uses of methyl bromide, and concluded that a total of ten
thousand metric tons of methyl bromide representing sixteen different
"critical" uses would be exempt.378 Once the EPA crafted its proposal of the
appropriate use of methyl bromide for critical uses only, the proposal moved
to the international level, where it was highly scrutinized.379 Finally, in
2004, the parties agreed to the initial sixteen proposed categories of appro-
priate use, but lowered the United States' amount of permissible usage to
slightly less than ten thousand metric tons of methyl bromide.8 0
With the final decision in hand, the EPA implemented these new
limitations into a new proposal for the critical use exemption.3 1' The NRDC
was one of several parties to submit a comment on this new proposal. 2
The NRDC claimed that the amount of methyl bromide proposed was not
the "technically and economically feasible minimum." 83 In essence, this
argument put the EPA and NRDC at odds as to the legal consequences of
this proposal." 4
Before the matter could go any further, the court had to determine
whether the NRDC even had standing to bring its petition for review of
the EPA's final rule.8 5 The court struggled with the analysis of whether
at least one of NRDC's members had standing to sue in his own right. 6
The NRDC claimed that its members faced potential health risks from
methyl bromide, but the court was not sure that this claim would suffice
as an injury in fact.38 7 The sufficient showing of injury in fact is that of
actual or imminent injury to the claimant-injury cannot be conjectural
or hypothetical.38 8 However, the court appeared to try to find a possible
loophole in the rule that the injury must be imminent. In carving this
small exception, the court noted that increases in risk at times can suf-
fice as injuries in fact.389 On one hand, the court supported this loophole,
378 Id. To implement the process by 2005, the EPA began its research process in 2002, three
years before any action would go into effect. See id.
379 Id.
380 Id. at5.
381Id.
382 Id.
m NRDC, 464 F.3d at 5.
3M Id.
385Id. at 5-6.
3 6Id.
37 Id. at 6.
3M Id.
389 NRDC, 464 F.3d at 6 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,
1234-35 (D.C.Cir. 1996)).
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finding that environmental and health injuries rely on probability.39 °
However, in the same breath, the court cautioned that this slight loop-
hole in the requirement of actual injury may be "too expansive."39'
The court attempted to strike a compromise by requiring that
claimants demonstrate a "substantial probability" that they will be in-
jured.392 Accordingly, the NRDC presented evidence from its expert that
demonstrated an increased risk, which the court accepted and, therefore,
concluded that the NRDC suffered an injury in fact.393 Perhaps the most
critical aspect of the problem of risk assessment is presented at the end of
the court's injury in fact analysis. When reviewing the scientific evidence,
the court cited the EPA's expert who described the problem that poses a
challenge for the role of risk assessment to this day. The expert cautioned
that expressing risk to the NRDC in annualized terms is not practical and
"it is more appropriate to express the risk as a population's cumulative
or lifetime risk."
3 94
However, as indicated by the court's struggle with the issue of
standing, injury must be analyzed and its probability must be presented
at the moment litigation ensues. The lifetime risk of a pollutant to an
individual's health, albeit of overall importance, is an impossible hurdle
to overcome at the outset of litigation. After all, one cannot determine
the lifetime risk of a pollutant until he or she is dead. By that time, any
effective remedy is moot. Therefore, there needs to be a balance between
the lifetime risk and present injury examinations in applying risk assess-
ment methodologies when evaluating standing under the increased risk
of future harm standard.
CONCLUSION
It likely will be a bumpy road ahead for courts and litigants in
evaluating standing for domestic and global environmental harms as the
courthouse door will alternate between swinging open and slamming shut
390id.
391 Id. "[Wiere all purely speculative 'increased risks' deemed injurious, the entire require-
ment of 'actual or imminent injury' would be rendered moot, because all hypothesized,
nonimminent 'injuries' could be dressed up as increased risk of future injury.' Id. (quoting
Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
392 Id. See also Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002); La. Envtl. Action
Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
39sNRDC, 464 F.3d at 6-7.
394 Id. at 7.
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in assessing the applicability of the standing analysis in Massachusetts
v. EPA. Nevertheless, the courts will remain an indispensable vehicle for
progress in combating climate change in the immediate future, and
Massachusetts v. EPA may help enhance access to the courts enabling
potential victories in these suits. A potentially significant limitation on the
scope of Massachusetts v. EPA's applicability, however, is that it could be
interpreted to be limited to actions brought by states.
Massachusetts v. EPA stands for much more than enhanced access
to the courts; however, the required federal regulations to implement the
Massachusetts v. EPA decision and to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
under the CAA have yet to be implemented by EPA as of this writing. The
fact that the case has yet to be implemented also has implications for the
effect of the Court's standing analysis. Once Massachusetts v. EPA is im-
plemented, the role of procedural injury claims under the CAA's citizen
suit provision will take on increased significance as the most viable mech-
anism for environmental standing for local impacts of global atmospheric
harms. Such a statutory "right" can be subject to abuse, however, as the
Pacific Legal Foundation's case cautions with respect to the listing of the
polar bear as threatened under the ESA.
The doctrines of procedural injury and increased risk of future
harm overlap in the context of standing for global environmental harms.
The line of cases in the ozone depletion context finding traditional stand-
ing for plaintiffs affected by local impacts of those environmental threats
is well reasoned and yielded sensible outcomes. There is a gray area in the
context of how far procedural injury and increased risk of future harm
analysis can be inserted into these contexts for future cases, however.
These two doctrines have been exclusively applied in the domestic con-
text to date. Nevertheless, the science supporting local impacts of global
environmental harms is much clearer now than it was even a few years
ago. Therefore, a new line of cases applying these standards to climate
change and related global harm contexts is on the horizon.
In moving forward, several considerations are important. First,
environmental standing jurisprudence must not stray from its founda-
tional cases. The "actual or imminent" and "concrete and particularized"
standard from Lujan and the need to allege an interest in and/or use of
resources in one's locality as in Laidlaw must always be a starting point.
The geographical nexus component of procedural injury helps ensures this
grounding for procedural injury claims to prevent the courts from becoming
a forum for grievances that are better addressed by the political branches.
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Second, these cautions notwithstanding, it is nonetheless important
to err on the side of ensuring that environmental standing continues to
evolve in a way that affords meaningful access to the courts during this
era of global environmental crisis in which we live. Instances of abuse of
the court system in environmental litigation are rare and are only likely
in times of desperation, as we have seen in the U.S. for the past several
years while the nation waits for a long-overdue mandatory federal leg-
islative response to the climate change issue. The implementation of the
Massachusetts v. EPA case is the first step on that path. Nevertheless,
there will be a continuing need for litigants to seek the courts as an ave-
nue for well-deserved remedies for climate change impacts even after the
federal legislative regime is in place, as is evident in the Kivalina case.
Third, a workable version of risk assessment methodology must
be fully embraced if the NRDC v. EPA "substantial probability" standard
is to govern increased risk of future harm cases. Toxic tort litigation and
other highly scientific areas of the law routinely rely on risk assessment
analysis. Climate change science is still uncertain, though becoming less
so, risk assessment methodology, therefore, will be critical as a mea-
suring stick to evaluate the viability of plaintiffs' alleged imminence and
increased risk of future harm claims at issue in these cases.
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